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I. INTRODUCTION
The Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (Texas ADR
Act),' passed in 1987 and codified in chapter 154 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, served to jump-start the use of medi-
ation in Texas.2 In the years following the passage of the Act, me-
diation has proved to be more successful than ever imagined.3 Yet,
1. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 154 (Vernon 2005).
2. See generally Frank G. Evans, Introduction, Symposium, Problem Solving Progress:
Peacemakers and the Law, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1 (2004) (providing a history of the
development of the Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution (Texas ADR Act)).
3. See generally Frank Evans & Teresa Stanton Collett, Forward, Final Report Sympo-
sium on Texas Mediator Qualifications and Standards, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 375 (1997) (not-
ing the impact of dispute resolution on American society and finding ADR to be regularly
practiced in a number of forums, from businesses and the government to schools and insti-
tutions); Cyndi Krier & Claudia Nadig, 1987 Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures
Act: An Overview, 51 TEX. B.J. 22 (1988) (advocating that the passage of the Texas Alter-
native Dispute Resolution Procedures Act in 1987 was a landmark year for ADR in
Texas); John P. McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil Cases in State Courts: A Litigant's
Perspective on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 813, 814 (1999)
(examining court-based mediation in five states, all of which have had "substantial experi-
ence with court-based mediation and strong leadership from statewide court-based dispute
resolution offices"); M. Colleen McHugh, ADR: A Report from the Chairman, 51 TEX. B.J.
14 (1988) (proposing ADR as "an alternative to the often costly and time-consuming pro-
cess of litigation"); Francis Flaherty, ADR Industry: Rapid Growth Brings Pains, ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Oct. 1993, at 133 (indicating that the ADR industry has
experienced rapid growth and finding it likely that for-profit ADR firms will obtain even
more future business). The effectiveness of mediation has spread nationwide. See Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settle-
ments, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340-41 (1994) (noting that the Civil Justice Reform Act
"promotes settlement through alternative dispute resolution"); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982) (asserting that federal judges have abandoned
their classic judicial role as disinterested decisionmakers and are now beginning to take on
a more active role as mediators, negotiators and planners); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The
Quiet Revolution Comes to Kentucky: A Case Study in Community Mediation, 81 Ky. L.J.
855, 882 (1993) (illustrating the development of court-ordered mediation and its interac-
tion with constitutional issues); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's
Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 199-201, app. at 229-31
(2003) (discussing the proliferation of mediation).
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there have been few judicial interpretations, alterations, or chal-
lenges to the Act. Except for some degree of judicial neglect, it
could be said that the practice of mediation has been well served
and supported by the Texas bench and bar. Whether this neglect
has been benign, the result of uninformed attorneys, uninformed
courts (which would appear to be the case from the number of
opinions, significant to mediation practitioners, that are not desig-
nated for publication), or simply good statutory drafting, is a mat-
ter open to debate.
It is the purpose of this Article to explore Texas judicial opin-
ions, dealing with the Texas ADR Act. It should be noted at the
outset, that many of the opinions referred to in this Article have
not been designated for publication by the courts from which they
were issued.4 The concept of unpublished opinions, originally for-
mulated in response to a caseload explosion and to save shelf space
in rapidly expanding law libraries,5 has come under serious ques-
4. TEX. R. ApP. P. 47.7. This rule provides that "[o]pinions not designated for publi-
cation by the court of appeals under these or prior rules have no precedential value but
may be cited with the notation, '(not designated for publication)."' Id. The rule providing
for the nonpublication of opinions, originally written to save on the cost of printed mate-
rial, is no longer necessary in light of electronic storage and retrieval, and it has been the
subject of some controversy. See generally Weirich v. Weirich, 867 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1993)
(Enoch, J., concurring and Doggett, J., dissenting) (discussing the problem of the nonpubli-
cation rule, its conflicting interpretation, and its consequences); David M. Gunn, "Unpub-
lished Opinions Shall Not Be Cited As Authority": The Emerging Contours of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 90(1), 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 115, 144 (1992) (discussing the former un-
published opinions rule, Rule 90 of Texas appellate procedure). Gunn notes that the rule
effectively balances two competing interests; it allows for unpublished opinions, effectively
reducing clutter in libraries, and also prohibits reliance on unpublished opinions. Id.
5. DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964); see Leah F. Chanin, A
Survey of the Writing and Publication of Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts, 67
LAW LIBR. J. 362, 362 (1974) (commenting on "the avalanche of published opinions" and
discussing the types of judicial action implemented to counter this problem); Martha J.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining
Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 757, 759 (1995) (asserting that "over the past two decades, the federal courts of
appeals have regularly employed practices that reduce the roles and uses of published judi-
cial opinions" mainly in response to burgeoning caseloads); Marion A. Oliver, Rule 90: The
Limited Publication Controversy, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 929, 931 (1994) (noting that
American "scholars have warned against the 'uncontrolled proliferation of law reports'
since the early 19th century"); George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished
Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 478 (1988) (asserting that the limited publication of
judicial decisions was one of the responses of "American courts to the unmanageable
growth of law reports").
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tion in recent years.6 In the year 2000, a panel of the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, ruling in Anastasoff v. United States,7 held
that the federal rule prohibiting the citation of unpublished opin-
ions as precedent was unconstitutional.' The Texas Supreme Court
was clearly aware of the growing controversy 9 and amended the
6. See Robert J. Martineau, Restriction on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opin-
ions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 119, 122 (1994) (discussing the criticisms
of unpublished opinions and noting the recommendation of the Advisory Council of Ap-
pellate Justice in 1973 to adopt limited publication). Some argue, for example, that unpub-
lished opinions are as important to essential justice and fundamental fairness as published
opinions. See In re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit,
Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Each ruling, published or unpublished, involves the facts of a
particular case and the application of law-to the case. Therefore all rulings of this court
are precedents, like it or not, and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion by merely
banning their citation."). Indeed, "[t]o deny a litigant [the right to point to a prior decision
and show he is entitled to prevail under it] may well have overtones of a constitutional
infringement because of the arbitrariness, irrationality, and unequal treatment of the rule."
Id. Also note that the Supreme Court has had opportunities to rule on the constitutional-
ity of federal no-citation rules but has declined to do so. Id.; see also Jones v. Superinten-
dent, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972) (suggesting that the court "cannot deny litigants
and the bar the right to urge upon [the court] what [the court has] previously done");
David Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 COR-
NELL L. REV. 128, 141-45 (1977) (expressing concern about the equal protection and due
process implications of federal "no-citation" rules). But cf. Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965,
971 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, under certain circumstances, unpublished opinions can be
used to determine if the law is clearly established).
7. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on other grounds, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th
Cir. 2000).
8. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot
on other grounds, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); see Jerome I. Braun, Eighth Circuit Deci-
sion Intensifies Debate over Publication and Citation of Appellate Opinions, 84 JUDICA-
TURE 90, 91 (2000) (advocating that in Anastasoff v. United States, the Eighth Circuit
reopened the debate on unpublished opinions by declaring an unpublished opinion binding
and indicating "that the Constitution [forbids] non[ ]precedential dispositions").
9. See generally Weirich, 867 S.W.2d at 787-89 (containing concurring and dissenting
opinions debating the denial of a motion to publish); David Gunn, The Crumbling Rele-
vance of Rule 47.7, 13 App. ADvoc. 3, 9 (2000) (advocating dictum from the Texas Su-
preme Court in order to address how the doctrine of stare decisis applies in the courts of
appeals); David W. Holman, Is an Unpublished Opinion Still an Opinion?, 13 App. ADVOC.
2, 3 (2000) (suggesting that "Rule 47.7 should be changed to allow [an] unpublished opin-
ion to be treated as persuasive authority"). Interestingly, while prohibiting attorneys from
citing to unpublished Texas opinions, the Texas Supreme Court cited to unpublished opin-
ions in other states. See, e.g., N. Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 603, 606 n.2
(Tex. 1998) (citing to an unpublished Virginia opinion); Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline v.
Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 455 (Tex. 1998) (citing to an unpublished Tennessee opinion);
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 553 (Tex. 1998) (citing to an unpublished
Florida opinion); Worthy v. Collagen Corp., 967 S.W.2d 360, 375 (Tex. 1998) (citing to an
unpublished federal district court opinion).
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unpublished opinion rule in 1997 and again in 2002. Since January
1, 2003, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that these opin-
ions may be cited in judicial proceedings, even though they have
"no precedential value."' At the very minimum, the unpublished
opinions are now fair game for consideration.
The opinions collected in this Article, whether published or un-
published, serve to illustrate application of the Texas ADR Act.
They provide the only guidance that practitioners, judges, and
scholars have in interpreting the Act. This fact demonstrates the
problems with courts writing opinions used to determine the rights
of the parties, which are not published and which may not be used
as authority to decide other cases. The appellate courts' failure to
recognize the significance of decisions impacting the area of media-
tion, alone, justifies the collection of their decisions dealing with
mediation to call attention to the need for the publication of any
decision dealing with mediation.
With the passage of the Texas ADR Act, it became public policy
to "encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes, with special
consideration given to disputes involving the parent-child relation-
ship, including the mediation of issues involving conservatorship,
possession, and support of children, and the early settlement of
pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures."11
The legislature decreed that "[i]t is the responsibility of all trial and
appellate courts and their court administrators to carry out the pol-
10. TEX. R. APP. PROC. 47.7. The notion that an opinion that settles the rights of
parties to a dispute, which reflects the judgment of the judges issuing the opinion, may be
cited (i.e., given to another court for consideration), but has "no precedential value" is a
contradictory statement. Id. The Amarillo Court of Appeals has taken a workable ap-
proach to the conundrum created by prohibiting an opinion from being considered as pre-
cedent, but allowing it to be cited by counsel and courts:
By stating that unpublished opinions may be cited but have no precedential value,
we perceive the intent of the rule to be that a court has no obligation to follow such
opinions. The effect of the rule is to afford parties more flexibility in pointing out such
opinions and the reasoning employed in them rather then simply arguing, without
reference, that same reasoning. However, the court to [which] an unpublished opin-
ion is cited has no obligation to follow the opinion or to specifically distinguish such
opinion. They may be cited merely as an aid in developing reasoning that may be
employed by the reviewing court be it similar or different. Even so, we do not view
Rule 47.7, or the former rule, as justifying unreasoned inconsistency on the part of an
appellate court.
Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. ref'd).
11. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.002 (Vernon 2005).
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icy under [s]ection 154.002. "112 One of the means authorized by this
legislation to carry out this policy was mediation.
13
II. GETTING TO MEDIATION 4
A. Mediation Defined
Under section 154.023(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code, "[m]ediation is a forum in which an impartial person,
12. Id. § 154.003.
13. Id. § 154.023(a).
14. See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 3 (2002) (noting that a comparison of the UMA and
the Texas ADR Act demonstrates that existing Texas law, both statutory and judicial,
seems to conform to the Act). The Texas ADR Act provides the following:
SECTION 3. SCOPE.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (c), this [Act] applies to a
mediation in which:
(1) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute or court or adminis-
trative agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative agency, or
arbitrator;
(2) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that dem-
onstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged
against disclosure; or
(3) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds himself or
herself out as a mediator or the mediation is provided by a person that holds itself
out as providing mediation.
(b) The [Act] does not apply to a mediation:
(1) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or termination of a
collective bargaining relationship;
(2) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes estab-
lished by a collective bargaining agreement, except that the [Act] applies to a
mediation arising out of a dispute that has been filed with an administrative
agency or court;
(3) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or
(4) conducted under the auspices of:
(A) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are students or
(B) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are residents of that
institution.
(c) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding
reflects agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, the
privileges under [s]ections 4 through 6 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed
upon. However, [s]ections 4 through 6 apply to a mediation communication made
by a person that has not received actual notice of the agreement before the commu-
nication is made.
Legislative Note: To the extent that the Act applies to mediations conducted under the
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the mediator, facilitates communication between parties to pro-
mote reconciliation, settlement, or understanding among them."' 5
Obviously, not all settlement meetings constitute mediation,16 but
any doubt can be resolved by either a court order to mediate or by
an agreement to mediate. The Texas ADR Act further declares
that in mediation, "[a] mediator may not impose his own judgment
on the issues for that of the parties. ' 17 This, arguably, precludes
mediators from giving case evaluations, although mediators in
Texas regularly give such evaluations. It should be clear from this
language that settlement conferences with judges are not media-
tions,' 8 but some issues remain open, such as whether the media-
tion definition covers peer mediations that are excluded under the
Uniform Mediation Act (UMA).' 9
B. Court-Ordered Mediation
Under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, section
154.021(a), any court20 on its own motion, may refer a dispute to
mediation. 21 This power should exist as long as a court retains ple-
15. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023(a) (Vernon 2005).
16. Saeta v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 612 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a
hearing held by a termination review board was not a mediation, and thus, not protected
by the confidentiality provisions of the mediation statute). But see DeRolph v. State, 758
N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ohio 2001) (holding that a settlement conference is a mediation).
17. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023(b) (Vernon 2005).
18. See James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges Should Not Mediate Cases
Assigned to Them for Trial, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 11, 12 (indicating that "Texas
bar and judicial disciplinary commissions" have interpreted a provision in the 1972 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct as one that prohibits judges from acting as mediators or
arbitrators in settlement conferences); Frank E.A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, 6-1
Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 11, 22, 24 (urging that judges should not act as mediators
in cases that they will later adjudicate).
19. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 3 (2002).
20. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.001(1) (Vernon 2005) (stating that
"'court' includes an appellate court, district court, constitutional county court, statutory
county court, family law court, probate court, municipal court, or justice of the peace
court").
21. See id. § 154.021 (indicating that mediation is only one of the choices the court
may use in implementing the policy of the state). This section of the Texas Civil Practices
and Remedies Code allows courts to authorize:
(a)(1) an alternative dispute resolution system established under Chapter 26, Acts of
the 68th Legislature, Regular Session, 1983 (Article 2372aa, Vernon's Texas Civil
Statutes);
(2) a dispute resolution organization; or
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nary power over a case. 22 In Dennis v. Smith,23 however, the Texas
Court of Appeals in Houston (First District) held that a court has
no power to order mediation as a prerequisite to filing any future
motion to modify an agreement concerning child support and cus-
tody.24 In contrast, under the Texas Family Code, section 153.0071,
a trial court may order mediation in a suit affecting the parent-
child relationship,25 and under section 153.134(b)(5), the court may
"recommend that the parties use an alternative dispute resolution
method before requesting enforcement or modification of the
terms and conditions of the joint conservatorship through litiga-
tion."26 Clearly, the court's order in Dennis was improper, because
it did not apply to a suit and was not a recommendation.
"If a court determines that a pending dispute is appropriate for
referral under [s]ection 154.021, the court shall notify the parties of
its determination. '27 Then, "[a]ny party may, within [ten] days af-
ter receiving the notice under [s]ubsection (a), file a written objec-
tion to the referral. ' 28 Once an objection is filed, "[i]f the court
finds that there is a reasonable basis for an objection filed under
[s]ubsection (b), the court may not refer the dispute under [s]ection
154.021. "29 The failure of a party to timely object to mediation
(3) a nonjudicial and informally conducted forum for the voluntary settlement of
citizens' disputes through the intervention of an impartial third party, including
those alternative dispute resolution procedures described under this subchapter.
(b) The court shall confer with the parties in the determination of the most appropri-
ate alternative dispute resolution procedure.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Paul v. Paul, 870 S.W.2d 349, 349-50 (Tex. App.-Waco
1994, no writ) (indicating that parties may file a written proposal suggesting the most ap-
propriate ADR procedure under section 154.021(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code); Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
no writ) (stating that section 154.021(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
authorizes a trial court to refer a dispute to an ADR procedure on its own motion).
22. See Permanente Med. Ass'n of Tex. v. Johnson, 917 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1996, no writ) (stating that mediation should not be ordered during a period of statu-
tory abatement).
23. 962 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
24. See Dennis v. Smith, 962 S.W.2d 67, 74 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet.
denied) (holding that the trial court erred by ordering mediation as a prerequisite to filing
a motion to modify).
25. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071 (Vernon 2002).
26. Id. § 153.134(b)(5).
27. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.022(a) (Vernon 2005).
28. Id. § 154.022(b).
29. Id. § 154.022(c).
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may result in sanctions, if the party then fails to appear at the me-
diation3" or fails to mediate in good faith.31 Likewise, on appeal,
the failure to mediate in accordance with the appellate court's or-
der32 may result in the dismissal of an appeal, if the appellant fails
to timely mediate and then fails to respond to an order to complete
mediation by a specified date.33
C. Suggestions for Mediation
While any party or counsel for any party, as well as the court,
may suggest referral to mediation, 34 it is improper for the jury to be
asked to decide whether to adjourn the case for mediation before
hearing evidence.35 Where the parties have, by contract, agreed to
allow either party to call for conciliation or arbitration, it is im-
proper to deny conciliation, in favor of arbitration, where concilia-
tion36 is elected by one of the parties. 37 An agreement to mediate,
before submitting a case to arbitration, is a condition precedent to
30. See Seidel v. Bradberry, No. 3:94-CV-0147-G, 1998 WL 386161, at *1-3 (N.D. Tex.
July 7, 1998) (holding that the court can levy sanctions upon a party who fails to attend a
court-ordered mediation).
31. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1998, pet. denied) (finding that a trial court can assess costs when a party does not file a
written objection to a court's order to mediate and then refuses to mediate in good faith).
32. See TEX. R. App. P. 42.3 (authorizing dismissal "because the appellant.., failed to
comply with a requirement of these rules, a court order, or a notice from the clerk requir-
ing a response or other action within a specified time").
33. See Holley v. Lefebvre, No. 14-99-0709-CV, 2000 WL 4930, at *1 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 6, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (ordering that
the appeal be dismissed because the parties failed to complete mediation by a specific
date).
34. See Downey v. Gregory, 757 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, no writ) (stating that any party may suggest referral to an ADR procedure).
35. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 566 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (finding error to be harmless because "the reference to
mediation was cured by the trial court's strict admonition that the jurors were not to infer
from his remarks anything about the merits of the case").
36. See Freis v. Canales, 877 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (noting
that the term "conciliation" was apparently used in the contract, but whether the parties
intended to use the less formal process of conciliation than mediation is not clear). In any
event, any difference in meaning did not change the holding of the court. Id.
37. See id. (holding that the plaintiff had a contractual right to choose either concilia-
tion or arbitration, and that because plaintiff chose conciliation, the trial court was without
power to order arbitration); see also Belmont Constructors, Inc. v. Lyondell Petrochemical
Co., 896 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (concluding that
the contract provided for mandatory arbitration only in the event the parties could not first
agree on an alternate method of resolution).
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arbitration.38 However, if the mediation is unsuccessful, arbitra-
tion is then required and may be compelled.3 9
While no Texas court has yet discussed the issue, it seems that
the Texas statute40 will apply to any form of mediation agreed to by
the parties. As discussed in the commentary to the UMA, the issue
can be left to the self-determination of the parties, including those
provided by religious groups. 41 The issues to be considered are dis-
cussed in the commentary of section 3 of the UMA:
Finally, on the issue of [s]ection 3(a) inclusions into the Act, the
Drafting Committees discussed whether it should cover the many
cultural and religious practices that are similar to mediation and that
use a person similar to the mediator, as defined in this Act. On the
one hand, many of these cultural and religious practices, like more
traditional mediation, streamline and resolve conflicts, while solving
problems and restoring relationships. Some examples of these prac-
tices are Ho'oponopono, circle ceremonies, family conferencing, and
pastoral or marital counseling. These cultural and religious practices
bring richness to the quality of life and contribute to traditional me-
diation. On the other hand, there are instances in which the applica-
tion of the Act to these practices would be disruptive of the practices
and therefore undesirable. On balance, furthering the principle of
self-determination, the Drafting Committees decided that those in-
volved should make the choice to be covered by the Act in those
instances in which other definitional requirements of [s]ection 2 are
met by entering into an agreement to mediate reflected by a record
or securing a court or agency referral pursuant to [s]ection 3(a)(1).
At the same time, these persons could opt out the Act's coverage by
not using this triggering mechanism. This leaves a great deal of lee-
way, appropriately, with those involved in the practices.42
38. See Belmont Constructors, 896 S.W.2d at 357 (holding that the contract language
calling for a different method of dispute resolution constituted a condition precedent to
mandatory arbitration).
39. See In re Weekley Homes, 985 S.W.2d 111, 114-15 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998,
no pet.) (holding that, whether a party is released from a purchase agreement's arbitration
provision as a result of the vendor's failure to seek mediation, is a procedural question
properly addressed by the arbitrator).
40. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 154 (Vernon 2005).
41. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 3 cmt. 2(a) (2002).
42. Id.; see also F. Matthews-Giba, Religious Dimensions of Mediation, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1695, 1698-99 (2000) (describing the types and usefulness of various forms of
religious mediations).
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No cases dealing with any form of religious mediation were found
in researching case law for this Article.
D. Limitation upon the Power to Order Mediation
1. Administrative Appeals
Stays of administrative appeals for mediation may not be valid,
at least where the appeal is not controlled by the Administrative
Procedure Act, codified in chapter 2001 of the Texas Government
Code.43 While the Administrative Procedure Act includes a provi-
sion permitting modifications of any of the time limits prescribed
for an administrative agency, that Act does not apply to all admin-
istrative appeals.44 For example, under the Texas Education Code,
an appeal from the Commissioner of Education is not controlled
by the Administrative Procedure Act.
45
In Moses v. Dallas Independent School District,46 Cortez, a public
school teacher, contested her proposed termination to the Com-
missioner of Education. 47 After a hearing, and following the rec-
ommendation of the hearing examiner, the Dallas Independent
School District (DISD) Board of Trustees terminated Cortez's em-
ployment.48 Cortez filed a petition for review with the Commis-
sioner on December 9, 1997.49 Any response by the DISD was due
by December 29, 1997, but was not received.5" The material was
reforwarded in January 1998.51 The parties agreed to waive the
failure to follow the procedural requirements of the Texas Educa-
tion Code.52 On January 8, 1998, the administrative law judge or-
43. See Moses v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 12 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000,
no pet.) (stating that unlike the Administrative Procedure Act, the Texas Education Code
has no provisions permitting modification of any time limits).
44. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.147 (Vernon 2000) (indicating that the individ-
ual state agency must approve any modifications of time limits).
45. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.301(e) (Vernon 1996) (stating that an appeal to
the commissioner under the Texas Education Code is not subject to chapter 2001 of the
Texas Government Code).
46. 12 S.W.3d 168 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.).
47. See Moses v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 12 S.W.3d 168, 171-72 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2000, no pet.) (explaining that after the superintendent recommended Cortez's termina-
tion, Cortez appealed the matter to the Commissioner of Education).




52. Moses, 12 S.W.3d at 170.
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dered the appeal abated for 120 days to allow mediation of the
case. 53 The appeal was reinstated on February 23, 1998, after the
DISD rejected the agreement resulting from the mediation.54 The
DISD filed for judicial review on April 20, 1998.11 The district
court reversed the Commissioner's decision and ordered Cortez re-
instated. 6 The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment
and dismissed the appeal.57
The Texas Education Code requires an appeal within thirty days
of receipt of notice of the Commissioner's decision.58 The court of
appeals found that a timely notice was jurisdictional, and that the
Commissioner did not have the authority to abate the statutory
deadlines. 59 The court of appeals rejected the argument that the
state's "policy encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution
procedure in appropriate aspects of a state agency's operations and
programs" gave the Commissioner authority to abate the appeal.6 °
They found this "expression of general policy is [not] sufficient to
override the mandatory statutory deadlines set forth in the educa-
tion code. ' 61 Since the mandatory time for perfecting the appeal






57. See Moses, 12 S.W.3d at 171-72 (explaining the court of appeals's decision in the
case).
58. See TEx. EDUC. CoDE ANN. § 21.307(b) (Vernon 1996) (addressing the timeframe
in which an appeal must be perfected under the Texas Education Code).
59. See Moses v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 12 S.W.3d 168, 171-72 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2000, no pet.) (holding that the Commissioner had no authority to modify the timetables,
and because neither party had perfected a judicial appeal within the specified time, the
court was without jurisdiction).
60. See id. at 171 (noting the current citation of the "Act of May 21, 1997, 75th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 934, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2932 (renumbered and amended 1999) (current
version at TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 2009.001-.055 (Vernon 2000)").
61. Id.
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2. Peace Bond Proceedings
Disputes arising from peace bond applications6 2 may not be or-
dered to be mediated.63
3. Other Forms of Proceedings
Texas might want to consider whether to extend or exclude the
coverage of the Texas ADR Act to international commercial con-
ciliation, which is covered by specific statute in some states.
64
E. The Appointment of the Third-Party-Neutral: The Mediator
Qualifications and Training Requirement
Both lawyers and nonlawyers6 5 serve as mediators in Texas.
66
While issues are raised concerning whether mediation constitutes
the practice of law by lawyers (thus controlled by the ethics of the
legal profession) acting in a nonlawyer role,67 the issue is more
62. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 7.01-.18 (Vernon 2005) (describing the
process of peace bond applications).
63. See In re Jones, 55 S.W.3d 243, 247, 249-50 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2000) (ordering
the justices of the peace to receive special instruction on the limits of a magistrate's power
to order mediation in peace bond proceedings).
64. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.401 (West 1988) (stating that a written
conciliation agreement shall be treated as an arbitral award and shall have the same effect
as a final award in arbitration); FLA. STAT. § 684.10 (1986) (stating that if during the arbi-
tral proceedings a party claims in writing that another party has not complied with an
agreement to submit a dispute to mediation or conciliation, the arbitral tribunal shall hold
the proceeding in abeyance pending submission of the dispute to mediation or conciliation
as agreed); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.60 (1991) (indicating that an arbitral tribunal, upon
agreement of the parties, may use mediation, conciliation, or other procedures to en-
courage settlement of the dispute).
65. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of
"Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 49 (1991) (arguing that the elimination of
nonlawyer mediators can adversely impact the practice of mediation); Matthew Daiker, No
J.D. Required: The Critical Role and Contributions of Non-Lawyer Mediators, 24 REV. Li-
TIG. 499, 500 (2005) (arguing that nonlawyers should be allowed to mediate disputes and
that the elimination of nonlawyer mediators can adversely impact the practice of
mediation).
66. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.052 (Vernon 2005) (noting that the
requirements to serve as an impartial third party in Texas does not include having a law
degree, but rather, it requires attending a certain amount of training in dispute resolution
techniques).
67. See Michelle D. Gaines, A Proposed Conflict of Interest Rule for Attorney-
Mediators, 73 WASH. L. REV. 699, 699 (1998) (noting that "[w]hen attorneys practice medi-
ation, it is unclear where they should look for guidance: attorney rules of professional
conduct, mediator ethical standards, or both"); Sandra Purnell, The Attorney As Media-
tor-Inherent Conflict of Interest?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986, 987 (1985) (discussing the prac-
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commonly raised as to whether nonlawyer-mediators are practicing
law.68
There is a great misconception that there is some governmental
method of certifying69 Texas mediators who receive forty hours of
mediation training. v There is not. Although the Texas Supreme
Court and its Advisory Committee on Court-Annexed Mediations
studied such a process,71 no government sanctioned procedure cur-
rently exists for the certification of mediators.72 To the contrary, in
June 2005, the Advisory Committee on Court-Annexed Mediations
found that there "was no consensus within the mediation profes-
sion in Texas as to whether the [s]upreme [c]ourt should become
involved in credentialing and/or registration of mediators. There-
fore, the committee recommended that the [c]ourt take no action
tice of law and whether the professional norms of the legal practice should govern
mediation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG., May 1996, at 57, 60 (asking whether mediation falls under the practice
of law).
68. See Derek A. Denckla, Non-Lawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An
Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2581-82 (1999)
(explaining that in all states, nonlawyers are prohibited from practicing law); Jacqueline M.
Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Professional Monop-
oly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235, 269-73 (2002) (dis-
cussing how mediation and the practice of law overlap); Geetha Ravindra, When Mediation
Becomes the Unauthorized Practice of Law, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Aug.
1997, at 94, 94 (discussing West Virginia litigation on the subject of the unauthorized prac-
tice of law).
69. See generally Donald T. Weckstein, Mediator Certification: Why and How, 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 758-59 (1996) (indicating that there is no governmental standard for
certifying mediators but that there is a public interest in such certification); Ellen Wald-
man, Credentialing Approaches: The Slow Movement Toward Skills-Based Testing Contin-
ues, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2001, at 13, 14 (describing the Texas system).
70. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.052 (Vernon 2005) (stating that
forty hours of training is required in most situations); Tex. Mediator Credentialing Ass'n,
Criteria for Credentials, http://www.txmca.org/criteria.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2005) (list-
ing the criteria that the Texas Mediator Credentialing Association requires of mediators)
(on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
71. See Suzanne M. Duvall & John P. Palmer, ADR Council Authorizes Committee to
Meet with Mediator Groups to Establish Credentialing Program Based on the Revised Pro-
posal for a Voluntary Program for Mediators' Designation "Credentialed Mediator", Tex.
Mediator Credentialing Ass'n, http://www.texasadr.org/tmca.cfm#toc (last visited Oct. 13,
2005) (describing the creation of the Quality of Practice Task Force and the Texas Supreme
Court Advisory Committee) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
72. See Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator
Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 723, 724, 730-32 (1996) (discuss-
ing the defeat of Senate Bill 1428, which sought to establish a system for certification of
mediators).
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with regard to credentialing. ' 73 Attempts at voluntary credential-
ing, in the works for some time,74 appear to be bearing fruit in the
form of the Texas Mediator Credentialing Association.75
The court, making the appointment of a third-party-neutral, in-
stead, is given wide latitude in choosing the third-party-neutral.
The statute provides that "[i]f a court refers a pending dispute for
resolution by an alternative dispute resolution procedure under
[s]ection 154.021, the court may appoint an impartial third party to
facilitate the procedure. '76 In addition, "[t]he court may appoint a
third party who is agreed on by the parties if the person qualifies
for appointment under this subchapter. '77 This third-party-neutral
is to "have completed a minimum of [forty] classroom hours of
training in dispute resolution techniques in a course conducted by
an alternative dispute resolution system or other dispute resolution
organization approved by the court making the appointment[,]
78
unless the case is one relating to the parent-child relationship, in
which event, the "person must complete the training required by
[s]ubsection (a) and an additional [twenty-four] hours of training in
the fields of family dynamics, child development, and family law."
79
73. Tex. Sup. Ct., Approval of Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, Misc. Docket No. 05-
9107 (June 13, 2005), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/05/
05910700.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2005) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); see also
Supreme Court Approves Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, 68 TEX. B.J. 856, 856 (2005)
(announcing the recent approval of ethical guidelines for mediators by the Texas Supreme
Court).
74. See R. Michael Rogers & John P. Palmer, A Speaking Analysis of ADR Legisla-
tion for the Divorce Neutral, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 871, 940-47 (2000) (reporting on the for-
mation and development of the Texas Mediator Credentialing Committee (TMCC)). See
generally Suzanne M. Duvall & John P. Palmer, ADR Council Authorizes Committee to
Meet with Mediator Groups to Establish Credentialing Program Based on the Revised Pro-
posal for a Voluntary Program for Mediators' Designation "Credentialed Mediator", Tex.
Mediator Credentialing Ass'n, http://www.texasadr.org/tmca.cfm#toc (last visited Oct. 13,
2005) (addressing efforts to establish a voluntary credentialing program) (on file with the
St. Mary's Law Journal).
75. See Charles Pou, Jr., "Embracing Limbo": Thinking About Rethinking Dispute
Resolution Ethics, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 199, 218 n.96 (2003) (discussing the Texas project);
Tex. Mediator Credentialing Ass'n, Criteria for Credentials, http://www.txmca.org/crite-
ria.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2005) (establishing the criteria that the Texas Mediator
Credentialing Association requires of mediators) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
76. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.051(a) (Vernon 2005).
77. Id. § 154.051(b). "The court may appoint more than one third party." Id.
§ 154.051(c).
78. Id. § 154.052(a).
79. Id. § 154.052(b).
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The court may, "[i]n appropriate circumstances... in its discretion
appoint a person as an impartial third party who does not qualify
under [s]ubsection (a) or (b) if the court bases its appointment on
legal or other professional training or experience in particular dis-
pute resolution processes."80
1. Ethical Standards or Guidelines for Mediators
Until recently, no officially sanctioned guideline for the ethical
conduct of mediators existed, although a number of organizational
standards have been promulgated." This subject is one where de-
velopment has long been expected,82 but few cases exist to assist in
defining the ethical guidelines to be followed by mediators.8 3 In
June 2005, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the recommendation
of its Advisory Committee on Court-Annexed Mediations, 84 find-
80. Id. § 154.052(c).
81. See, e.g., ABA Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, http://www.abanet.org/
dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2005)
(listing model standards of conduct for mediators) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Jour-
nal); The Association of Attorney-Mediators Ethical Guidelines, http://www.attorney-
mediators.org/ethics.html (last visited on Sept. 4, 2005) (summarizing developing issues in
the field of mediation) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); The State Bar of Texas,
Alternative Dispute Resolution Section, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, http://
www.texasadr.org/ethicalguidelines.cfm (last visited Sept. 4, 2005) (displaying the State Bar
of Texas guidelines for mediators) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); The State Bar
of Texas, Alternative Dispute Resolution Section, The Texas Mediation Trainer Round-
table Standards, http://www.texasadr.org/standards.cfm (last visited Sept. 4, 2005) (review-
ing the standards for basic mediation training in Texas) (on file with the St. Mary's Law
Journal); Texas Association of Mediators, Standards of Conduct, at 1-6, http://
www.txmediator.org/TAM%20SOP.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (listing the mediator
standards of conduct adopted by the Texas Association of Mediators) (on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal); see John D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 459 (1997) (summarizing different proposed standards
and discussing the subject areas with references to various ethical codes and cases on
point); Stephanie A. Henning, Note, A Framework for Developing Mediator Certification
Programs, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189, 198-99 (1999) (examining four proposed stan-
dards for the certification of mediators).
82. See Forrest S. Mosten, Institutionalization of Mediation, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 292, 292
(2004) (discussing development in the field of mediation).
83. See Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Con-
duct of Mediators, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 87, 98-99 (1997) (noting that lawsuits against
mediators are rare).
84. Tex. Sup. Ct., Approval of Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, Misc. Docket No. 05-
9107 (June 13, 2005), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/05/
05910700.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2005) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); Supreme
Court Approves Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, 68 TEX. B.J. 856, 856 (2005).
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ing that "there currently is consensus within the Texas mediation
profession that the [c]ourt should promulgate ethical rules. There-
fore, the committee recommended the Court adopt as its own as-
pirational guidelines those guidelines that the Alternative Dispute
Resolution section of the State Bar of Texas has adopted. '8 5 In
adopting these guidelines, the court noted that "[t]hese rules are
aspirational. Compliance with the rules depends primarily upon
understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon rein-
forcement by peer pressure and public opinion, and finally, when
necessary by enforcement by the courts through their inherent
powers and rules already in existence. ' 86 Finally, the court con-
cluded by noting:
Moreover, counsel representing parties in the mediation of a pend-
ing case remain officers of the court in the same manner as if appear-
ing in court. They are subject to the Texas Disciplinary Rules for
Lawyers and any local rules or orders of the court regarding the me-
diation of pending cases. They should aspire during mediation to
follow the The Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professional-
ism. Counsel shall cooperate with the court and the mediator in the
initiation and conduct of the mediation.87
2. Duties of the Third-Party-Neutral
It is the duty of the third-party-neutral, appointed as the media-
tor, to "encourage and assist the parties in reaching a settlement of
their dispute but [the mediator] may not compel or coerce the par-
ties to enter into a settlement agreement. '88 The third-party-neu-
tral mediator:
unless expressly authorized by the disclosing party.... may not dis-
close to either party information given in confidence by the other
and shall at all times maintain confidentiality with respect to commu-
nications relating to the subject matter of the dispute. Unless the
parties agree otherwise, all matters, including the conduct and de-
meanor of the parties and their counsel during the settlement pro-




88. TEX. Cirv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053(a) (Vernon 2005).
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cess, are confidential and may never be disclosed to anyone,
including the appointing court.89
3. The "Style of the Mediator"
The Texas ADR Act provides that "[a] mediator may not impose
his own judgment on the issues for that of the parties."9 Addition-
ally, the mediator is to "encourage and assist the parties in reach-
ing a settlement of their dispute but may not compel or coerce the
parties to enter into a settlement agreement." 91 Beyond this, the
Act is silent on the methods to be used by a mediator in settling a
case, and the Texas cases, with few exceptions, have not gone into
this aspect of mediation. Although it can be argued that the lan-
guage allows only the use of facilitative mediation, evaluative me-
diation seems to predominate as the method used by most
mediators in Texas.92 However, given the academic discussions
surrounding style, it is inevitable that the issues concerning style
will find their way into the courts. It is not the purpose of this
Article to fully examine the merits of the various styles, but there is
evolving literature on the subject.
93
89. Id. § 154.053(b), (c).
90. Id. § 154.023(b).
91. Id. § 154.053(a).
92. See James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Ques-
tions & Tentative Proposals, From an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769,
770-71 (1997) (discussing the evaluative mediation method and its prevalence in practice);
D. Ryan Nayar, Note, Texas ADR 101: Analyzing the Use of Compulsory Mediation
Clauses in Commercial Contracts: Advantages, Enforceability, & Drafting Guidelines, 40
TEX. J. Bus. L. 257, 268 (2004) (noting the popularity of evaluative mediation); Nick Hall,
Alternative Dispute Resolution 2020, Hous. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 37, 38-39 (observing
that of the many methods of mediation, evaluative mediation is the process of choice, espe-
cially in disputes bound for or pending in court).
93. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of
"Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 50, 59-73 (1991) (examining the new Flor-
ida mediation programs and concerns with its implementation); Leonard Riskin, Under-
standing Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13 (1996) (discussing the different mediator strategies, tech-
niques, and styles); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The
Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 949, 950 (1997) (examining problems with the Florida Mediation rules and calling for
a more flexible system); Joseph B. Stullberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orien-
tations: End Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1002-03 (1997) (expres-
sing problems with the "Riskin Grid"); Leonard L. Riskin, Who Decides What? Rethinking
the Grid of Mediator Orientations, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003, at 22, 22-25 (with-
drawing the use of evaluation in the mediation process, at least where it interferes with
20061
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4. Fees
The appointing court is authorized to set "a reasonable fee for
the services of an impartial third party appointed. '9 4 After the ap-
pointing court sets a reasonable fee, "[u]nless the parties agree to a
method of payment, the court shall tax the fee for the services of
an impartial third party as other costs of court. '9 5 At this time, no
self-determination); see also Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How-and Why-
Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 41, 42 (2000)
(discussing the variations in mediation styles and why those styles may change during the
course of a case); John Bickerman, An Evaluative Mediator Responds, ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG., June 1996, at 70, 70 (approving of evaluative mediation styles, even
though some consider it a legalistic approach); Leonard Riskin, Mediator Orientations,
Strategies and Techniques, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Sept. 1994, at 111, 111-12
(proposing a system for classifying mediator orientations). Critics suggest that this ap-
proach represents a legalistic approach to mediation. See, e.g., Robert A. Creo, Mediation
2004. The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2004) (reflecting on the art
of mediation and the commercial mediator); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Pro-
cess Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1556 (1991) (identifying dangers in the medi-
ation process for women); Kimberly K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The
Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 71, 89 (1998) (explaining the origins of
mediation); John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Transform Each Other?, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 841 (1997) (examining the potential implications for lawyers and
mediators of the growing "liti-mediation" culture); Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Eval-
uative Mediation: Concerns About the Nature and Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 267, 269 (2001) (analyzing the evaluative method of media-
tion); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 937, 937 (1997) (discouraging the evaluative method in mediation); James H.
Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative
Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 769-70 (1997)
(discussing the positives and negatives of evaluative mediation); Donald T. Weckstein, In
Praise of Party Empowerment-And of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 501,
508 (1997) (discussing mediation and activist mediators); Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vi-
sion of Self- Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institu-
tionalization?, 6 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 37-58 (2001) (examining the possible means to
protect a party's self-determination in the mediation process); Roselle L. Wissler, Court-
Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 641, 661-63 (2002) (indicating that attorneys think that
mediators are less fair when they push for a particular settlement); Laurence D. Connor,
How to Combine Facilitation with Evaluation, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Feb.
1996, at 15, 15 (discussing the difference between mediators in standard evaluations and
special mediators); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Evaluative Mediation Is an Oxy-
moron, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Mar. 1996, at 31, 31 (challenging the evalua-
tive method in mediation); Maureen Laflin, Can Informed Consent Preserve the Integrity of
Mediation?, ADVOC. (Idaho), Nov. 2000, at 12, 12 (examining the Virginia lawyer-mediator
rules and discussing the purpose of mediation).
94. TEX. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.054(a) (Vernon 2005).
95. Id. § 154.054(b).
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constitutional challenge has been made to a court's order taxing
mediation fees as court costs.
5. Limited Immunity for the Third-Party-Neutral
There is limited immunity for uncompensated third-party-neu-
trals. The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, section
154.055(a), provides:
A person appointed to facilitate an alternative dispute resolution
procedure under this subchapter or under [c]hapter 152 relating to
an alternative dispute resolution system established by counties, or
appointed by the parties whether before or after the institution of
formal judicial proceedings, who is a volunteer and who does not act
with wanton and willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of
another, is immune from civil liability for any act or omission within
the course and scope of his or her duties or functions as an impartial
third party. For purposes of this section, a volunteer impartial third
party is a person who does not receive compensation in excess of
reimbursement for expenses incurred or a stipend intended as reim-
bursement for expenses incurred.96
6. Broader Immunity
In the case of court-ordered mediation, the mediator exercises
judgment and uses discretion, and therefore, acts in a judicial ca-
pacity. This, it would seem, should entitle the court appointed me-
diator to derived judicial immunity,97 at least "when all parties to a
96. Id. § 154.055(a).
97. See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that there is
quasi-judicial immunity for a mediator). Such a holding finds support in Texas. See Dallas
County v. Halsey, 87 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. 2002) (holding that a court reporter was not
entitled to judicial immunity but indicating that judicial immunity is available to court
functionaries, such as ad litems, who perform a judicial function). The policy reasons for
judicial immunity are also implicated when a judge delegates or appoints another person to
perform services for the court or when a person otherwise serves as an officer of the court.
Id. In this circumstance, the immunity attaching to the judge follows the delegation, ap-
pointment, or court employment. Id. The person acting in such a capacity also enjoys
absolute immunity, known as derived judicial immunity. Id. at 554; accord Antoine v. By-
ers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (stating that judicial immunity does not
extend to court reporters, but only to those whose "judgments are 'functional[ly] com-
parab[le]' to those of judges" and who "'exercise a discretionary judgment' as a part of
their function"); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (stating that "[a]
judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only
when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction"' (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80
20061
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dispute are receiving independent legal advice." '9
III. INABILITY TO ORDER GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATION
Although it has been argued that there should be a duty of good
faith in mediation,9 9 beyond mandating the neutrality of the media-
tor and the confidentiality of the proceedings, the Texas statute,
unlike others, 10 ° is silent about the duties of the participants in me-
diation. One of the few areas of mediation that has generated real
judicial discussion concerns the power of courts to sanction parties
who fail to mediate in good faith. 1 Shortly after the passage of
chapter 154 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the
Houston Court of Appeals for the First District, in an enlightened
U.S. 335, 351 (1871))); Turner v. Pruitt, 342 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1961) (noting that if the
court has jurisdiction, the judge is immune from liability for the actions taken); Delcourt v.
Silverman, 919 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (ex-
tending derived judicial immunity in a child custody case to a psychologist who had been
appointed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 167(a)(d)(1), (repealed in 1998, but now
found in substantially the same form at Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 204.4(a)), to ex-
amine the child). In Delcourt, the court also extended immunity to a guardian ad litem
appointed under Texas Family Code section 11.10 (repealed in 1995 and now codified at
Texas Family Code section 107.001) to represent the child and give the court impartial
recommendations. See id. (extending immunity to a guardian ad litem). But see Byrd v.
Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 707 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ dism'd by agr.) (holding that
a guardian ad litem appointed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 173 was not entitled to
derived immunity in a personal injury suit because the ad litem acted as the minor's per-
sonal representative in the settlement proceedings, and not on behalf of the court); see also
Cassondra E. Joseph, The Scope of Mediator Immunity: When Mediators Can Invoke Abso-
lute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 629, 635-48 (1997) (analyzing mediator
immunity and discussing whether it is necessary); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the
Practice of Law?, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., May 1996, at 57, 61 (noting the
current trend is to grant quasi-judicial immunity to court-based mediators).
98. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG., May 1996, at 57, 61.
99. See generally Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recom-
mended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 575 (1997) (arguing the benefits of
good faith in mediation).
100. John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Par-
ticipation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 78-80 (2002)
(reporting that "[a]t least twenty-two states and the territory of Guam have such statutory
requirements" and that "[a]t least twenty-one federal district courts and seventeen state
courts have local rules requiring good-faith participation").
101. See generally Richard D. English, Annotation, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Sanctions for Failure to Participate in Good Faith in, or Comply with Agreement Made in
Mediation, 43 A.L.R.5H 545 (1996) (discussing sanctions for failure to participate in alter-
native dispute resolutions).
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decision, Decker v. Lindsay, °2 found that the power to order medi-
ation does not include the power to order the parties to mediate in
good faith.10 3 The court noted that "[c]hapter 154 contemplates
mandatory referral only, not mandatory negotiation[,]' 10 4 and that
"[a] court cannot force the disputants to peaceably resolve their
differences, but it can compel them to sit down with each other.'
10 5
In Hansen v. Sullivan, °6 the trial court granted the plaintiff's
motion for mediation, and ordered the parties to "conduct settle-
ment negotiations in good faith."'' 0 Subsequently, the plaintiff
filed a motion for sanctions for the defendant's failure to negotiate
in good faith. The defendant's attorney filed an affidavit that he
and the defendant had been present for more than three hours,
until the mediator declared an impasse. The trial court ordered the
defendant to pay the plaintiff's mediation costs, plus attorney's
fees. The court of appeals conditionally granted a writ of manda-
mus, finding the sanction order to be void.
1 8
Referring to an order requiring "good faith" negotiations as
void, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, in In re Acceptance Insur-
ance Co., 0 9 reasoned that:
An order requiring "good faith" negotiation does not comport
with the voluntary nature of the mediation process .... A trial court
has power to enforce its "lawful" orders. But because the portion of
the trial court's mediation orders directing the parties to "make a
good faith effort to settle" is void, the trial court had no authority to
102. 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
103. See Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ) (finding that the judges order cannot require that the parties mediate in
good faith).
104. Id.; accord Charles J. McPheeters, Leading Horses to Water: May Courts Which
Have the Power to Order Attendance at Mediation Also Require Good-Faith Negotiation?,
1992 J. Disp. RESOL. 377, 386-87 (1992) (analyzing the holding in Decker); see also Johnson
v. Elayyan, No. 14-01-00381-CV, 2002 WL 959518, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.]
May 9, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (holding that the trial court did
not err in ordering mediation).
105. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 250.
106. 886 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding).
107. Hansen v. Sullivan, 886 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,
orig. proceeding).
108. Id. at 469 (citing Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
109. 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding).
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investigate whether relator complied with that portion of the
orders.'10
The court in In re Acceptance Insurance Co., specifically indi-
cated that the issue of a party's preparedness could not be the sub-
ject of a postmediation inquiry, since "[t]he issue of preparedness
relates to whether a party mediated in good faith, not to whether
the party attended or participated in the mediation.""'
The first court to approve a sanction for the failure to mediate in
good faith was the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Texas Depart-
ment of Transportation v. Pirtle,"2 which involved an action by a
motorist against the Texas Department of Transportation for inju-
ries received in a one-car accident.' 3 The trial court ordered the
parties to mediation, even though the Department of Transporta-
tion told the trial judge "from the beginning they weren't going to
mediate because it's the position of the Department of Transporta-
tion that part of its responsibilities in fulfilling its public trust is not
to settle disputed liability cases. 114 The Department of Transpor-
tation did not object to the referral to mediation.1 15 A jury found
that the Department of Transportation was not liable for damages,
but the trial court assessed against the Department of Transporta-
tion all costs of court, including attorney's fees and the mediation
fees Pirtle incurred, "finding that it had failed to mediate in good
faith."" 6 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's award of
mediation costs to the plaintiffs, noting that "[h]ad the department
exercised its statutory remedy by filing a written objection, Pirtle
would have been spared the expense of attending mediation. '11 7
Further, the court found "that it is not an abuse of discretion for a
trial court to assess costs where a party does not file a written ob-
jection to a court's order to mediation, but nevertheless refuses to
mediate in good faith."
'" 8
110. In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 452 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig.
proceeding).
111. Id.
112. 977 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).




116. Id. at 657.
117. Id. at 658.
118. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d at 658.
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The Fort Worth court, in Pirtle, distinguished earlier cases deny-
ing recovery for the failure to mediate in good faith." 9 It indicated
that, in Gleason v. Lawson, 2 ° the judge had not ordered the parties
to mediation.121 The court further noted that in Hansen v. Sullivan,
the litigant did mediate in good faith, but was unable to resolve the
dispute. 22 The court also reconciled the prior decision in Decker v.
Lindsay, by stating that it "addresses situations where a litigant
does file a written objection within ten days, but the judge over-
rules the objection.' 1 23 In Texas Parks & Wildlife Department v.
Davis,124 the Austin Court of Appeals refused to follow Pirtle, on
the ground that the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department had
timely objected to being ordered to mediation, did attend the me-
diation, and did make an offer of settlement.
125
In summary, under existing authority, courts cannot sanction a
party for the failure to mediate in good faith where: (1) the court
does not order the mediation; (2) the party mediates but fails to
settle; 126 or (3) the party timely objects to mediation, but is ordered
to mediate anyway.' 27 However, a sanction is possible if the party
does not object to the court-ordered mediation and still takes the
position at the mediation that it will not negotiate.1 28 Likewise, a
nonparty mediation participant who never objects to attending the
mediation and who voluntarily attends on behalf of his employer,
subjects himself to "the jurisdiction of the trial court and its han-
dling of the administrative and procedural matters concerning the
119. Id.
120. 850 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
121. Gleason v. Lawson, 850 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no
writ); see Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d at 658 (discussing Gleason).
122. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d at 658.
123. See id. (addressing Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1992, no writ)).
124. 988 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
125. See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1999, no pet.) (declining to follow Pirtle).
126. Hansen v. Sullivan, 886 S.W.2d 467,469 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no
writ).
127. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 251; see also Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 988 S.W.2d at
375 (holding that a court can order the party to attend mediation over objection, but can-
not require good faith mediation).
128. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1998, pet. denied) (assessing costs to a party for refusing to mediate in good faith).
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mediation."'1 9 Other states and commentators have addressed the
"good faith" problem surrounding mediation and seem to gener-
ally be in accord with the Texas approach.13 °
IV. SANCTIONS
A. Failure to Participate Without Time to Object
As noted earlier, under sectiorf 154.022 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code, a party must be allowed ten days after
receipt of notice of the order for mediation in which to object to
the referral to mediation.131 Thus, an order for sanctions for failure
to participate in mediation ordered within less than ten days notice
is erroneous.132 Note, however, that failure to object to a media-
tion order without the appropriate time for objection will waive the
right to object. The Dallas court stated in Keene Corp. v.
Gardner: 
133
Although the trial court has an interest in expediting the resolu-
tion of pending litigation, it cannot force the parties to follow an un-
reasonable timetable. If the trial court can force a resisting party to
129. In re Daley, 29 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding).
130. See generally Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Vol-
untarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 37-45
(1993) (discussing when and what sanctions are appropriate in compelled alternative dis-
pute resolution procedures); Charles J. McPheeters, Leading Horses to Water: May Courts
Which Have the Power to Order Attendance at Mediation Also Require Good-Faith Negotia-
tion?, 1992 J. Disp. RESOL. 377, 391 (1992) (stating that "[g]ood faith negotiation is not the
equivalent of an agreement, it is not a synonym for settlement, and it does not require any
particular outcome.... All that [courts] can require is that parties make an effort to reach
an agreement."); Edward Sherman, Court Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2096-2103 (1993) (sug-
gesting that the term "good faith" be replaced by "minimal meaningful participation" to
clarify what is expected of parties during alternative dispute resolution negotiations); Rich-
ard D. English, Annotation, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Sanctions for Failure to Partici-
pate in Good Faith, or Comply with Agreement Made in Mediation, 43 A.L.R.5TH 545
(1996) (examining the tools used by the courts to encourage good faith effort by the parties
to settle a dispute); Annette M. Sansone, Annotation, Imposition of Sanctions by Federal
Courts for Failure to Engage in Compromise and Settlement Negotiations, 104 A.L.R. FED.
461 (1991) (analyzing the use of sanctions by federal courts for failure to participate in
settlement negotiations).
131. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.022(b) (Vernon 2005).
132. See Keene Corp. v. Gardner, 837 S.W.2d 224, 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ
denied) (agreeing that it was erroneous for the trial court to order sanctions for noncompli-
ance with an order to mediate that itself did not comply with statutory procedure).
133. 837 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
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participate in alternative dispute resolution without regard to the
ten-day objection period, it renders a portion of the statute meaning-
less. While the trial court has discretion in determining whether al-
ternative dispute resolution is appropriate, it has no authority to
ignore the statute's intent and wording.'
34
B. Sanctions for Failure to Attend?
0
Another area of contention concerns the ability of the trial court
to use its authority to order specific persons to attend mediation.
135
Many other states have dealt with this problem, generally imposing
sanctions for failure of a party to attend mediation. 13 6 Clearly,
courts take a dim view of attorneys who choose not to attend
court-ordered mediation sessions. 137 There seems to be no doubt
that courts have the power to sanction parties, attorneys, or both,
who fail to attend a mediation.1 38 Trial courts may impose sanc-
134. Keene Corp. v. Gardner, 837 S.W.2d 224, 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ
denied).
135. See generally Richard D. English, Annotation, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Sanctions for Failure to Participate in Good Faith in, or Comply with Agreement Made in
Mediation, 43 A.L.R.5mI 545 (1996) (collecting cases dealing with failure to attend
mediations).
136. See, e.g., Lucas Auto. Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 275 F.3d 762, 769
(9th Cir. 2001) (granting sanctions against Lucas for failing to attend mediation); Nick v.
Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 592 (8th Cir. 2001) (denying reconsideration of the
district court's order that sanctioned an employer for failing to send a corporate represen-
tative to mediation); Inmuno Vital, Inc. v. Telemundo Group, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 561, 567
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (upholding sanctions against a producer for failing to appear at a media-
tion session accompanied by a person with the authority to settle the case); see also
Bulkmatic Transp. Co. v. Pappas, No. 99Civ.12070(RMB)(JCF), 2002 WL 975625, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002) (mem.) (imposing monetary sanctions against the party who failed
to show up at a mediation conference); Raad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 4:CV97-3015,
1998 WL 272879, at *1 (D. Neb. May 6, 1998) (explaining the appropriateness of sanctions
against a defendant who had received notice of the need to send a corporate representative
to a mediation session, but did not).
137. See Fleet Transp., Inc. v. Butler & Binion, L.L.P., No. 14-99-00500-CV, 2000 WL
963671, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 13, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated
for publication) ("While we do not address the merits of the cause of action, we take a
negative view of attorneys-officers of the court-deciding not to attend a mediation or-
dered by the trial court. Such conduct is best dealt with by the trial court.").
138. See In re K.A.R., No. 14-03-00970-CV, 2005 WL 2076408, at *8 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 30, 2005, no pet. h.) (explaining that "[t]he failure to comply
with a trial court's order to participate in mediation constitutes significant interference
with the court's core functions and, therefore, can support an award of sanctions imposed
under the court's inherent power to sanction"); Roberts v. Rose, 37 S.W.3d 31, 34-35 (Tex.
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tions to discipline an attorney for such improper behavior, 139 as
well as for bad faith abuse of the system.5 n0 Any sanction imposed
will be reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard141
to determine whether the trial court acted without reference to
"guiding rules or principles. ' 142 The sanction imposed must be
just143 meaning there should be a causal nexus between the im-
proper conduct and the sanction, and the sanction must be imposed
upon the offending party, whether it is the attorney, the client, or
both. 144 The sanction should be no more severe than necessary
145
to secure compliance with the law or court order, deter others from
failing to comply with the law or court order, and to punish those
who violate the law or court order.
146
In Seidel v. Bradberry,47 the district court ordered all parties to
attend mediation.148  The order stated that the mediation was
App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (upholding sanctions against an attorney for failure
to appear at a court-ordered mediation).
139. See Lawrence v. Kohl, 853 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,
no writ) (agreeing that the trial court had the authority to impose the sanctions merited by
the attorney's conduct).
140. See In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (citing Eichelberger
v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex. 1979)) (reprimanding attorneys who had de-
liberately filed multiple cases-with no intention to prosecute most of them-in search of a
sympathetic court by upholding the sanctions the trial court had imposed for that abuse).
141. Id.; Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 853 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding).
142. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985).
143. TransAm. Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991); Lux-
enberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
144. Wetherholt v. Mercado Mex. Cafe, 844 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1992, no writ).
145. TransAm. Natural Gas Corp., 811 S.W.2d at 917; see also Braden v. Downey, 811
S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (clarifying that while severe sanctions can
be imposed, they should be reserved for conduct especially meriting the severity).
146. Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam);
Chrysler Corp., 841 S.W.2d at 849.
147. No. 3:94-CV-0147-G, 1998 WL 386161 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 1998).
148. Seidel v. Bradberry, No. 3:94-CV-0147-G, 1998 WL 386161, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July
7, 1998); accord Lucas Auto. Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 275 F.3d 762, 769
(9th Cir. 2001) (ordering all parties to the suit to attend mediation); Universal Coops., Inc.
v. Tribal Coop. Mktg. Dev. Fed'n of India, 45 F.3d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring all
parties involved in the cause to attend mediation); Inmuno Vital, Inc. v. Telemundo Group,
Inc., 203 F.R.D. 561, 576 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that each party must attend mediation to
attempt to amicably resolve the suit without referring to trial); Raad v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 4:CV97-3015, 1998 WL 272879, at *2 (D. Neb. May 6, 1998) (holding that all
involved parties must attend mediation).
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mandatory, named the parties that were to appear, and ordered the
parties to "proceed in a good faith effort to resolve the case.
1' 49
The order further stated that failure to comply with the order
would result in sanctions.1 50 All nonincarcerated parties other than
the defendant, Michael Batten, appeared and settled.5 1 When
Batten failed to appear at the meditation or to show cause for not
appearing, the court imposed an order for sanctions in the amount
of $1400, which represented a proportionate part of the plaintiff's
mediation expenses and attorney's fees.
5 2
"When mediation is ordered under the authority of section
154.021, the trial court may compel disputants to sit down with
each other, though it cannot force them to peaceably resolve their
differences. ' 153 However, "[t]he county judge, as presiding officer
of a county, like the chief executive officer of a private corporation,
[and not himself a disputant] is an important official whose pres-
ence at [a] deposition or mediation should not be ordered absent
compelling reasons.
154
The extent of the court's power to require attendance at a medi-
ation is fully shown by the decision of In re Daley,55 where the trial
court ordered that all parties, attorneys, partners, principals, or of-
ficers of each nonindividual party attend the mediation, and de-
creed that "a]ll individuals ordered to attend, must remain in
attendance until the mediator declares the mediation concluded,
subject only to recesses as declared by the mediator.' 1 56 Daley, an
employee of Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, which in-
sured the defendant, Arnold, attended the mediation, along with
149. Seidel, 1998 WL 386161, at *1.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *3.
153. Nueces County v. De Pena, 953 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1997, orig. proceeding).
154. Id. at 837. In Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, relied upon by the
Corpus Christi Court in De Pena, the Texas Supreme Court held that in the context of
discovery, a party seeking to depose a high executive of a corporation must show "(1) that
there is a reasonable indication that the official's deposition is calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence, and (2) that less intrusive methods of discovery are un-
satisfactory, insufficient or inadequate." Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904
S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1995).
155. 29 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding).
156. In re Daley, 29 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding).
2006]
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
Czuchna, an attorney representing Lumbermens. 157 Daley left the
mediation at 2:45 P.M., giving Czuchna "authority to decide
whether insurance payments would be made by Lumbermens. "158
The next day, Williams, the plaintiff, filed a notice of intent to take
the deposition of Daley on the sole question of why he left the
mediation. 159 The trial court denied a motion to quash.160 The
court of appeals also denied mandamus relief, with one judge dis-
senting. 161 Justice Stover, writing for the court, found that:
Daley, though a non[ ]party, was, by his own admission, a mediation
participant, who was given settlement authority by Lumbermens.
Furthermore, Daley never objected to attending the mediation...
and voluntarily attended on behalf of his employer, Lumbermens. In
so doing, he voluntarily subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court in its handling of the administrative and procedural mat-
ters concerning the mediation.1
62
While dissenting, Chief Justice Walker agreed with the implicit
holding of the majority that the trial court "has necessary authority
to order the attendance of those persons or entities having author-
ity to settle, whether that be the attorney, the parties, or those
holding the settlement purse strings."' 63 In Roberts v. Rose, 6 4 the
San Antonio Court of Appeals approved sanctions against an at-
torney for failing to appear at a court-ordered mediation.1 65 In In
re K.A.R., 166 the Houston court, relying upon Roberts, upheld sanc-
tions against an attorney for unilaterally canceling a court-ordered
mediation.167 "The failure to comply with a trial court's order to
participate in mediation constitutes significant interference with
the court's core functions and, therefore, can support an award of





161. In re Daley, 29 S.W.3d at 919.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 920.
164. 37 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
165. Roberts v. Rose, 37 S.W.3d 31, 33-35 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
166. 171 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).




tion.'"168 Where the failure to attend the mediation is due entirely
to the fault of the attorney, it is error to strike the plaintiff's plead-
ings as a sanction for the failure to attend the mediation.
169
However, the Dallas Court of Appeals, in Luxenberg v. Mar-
shall,171 upheld the striking of a party's pleadings because of the
party's history of discovery abuse, violation of pretrial orders, and
failure to participate in a court-ordered mediation. 171 Using similar
reasoning, the Austin Court of Appeals, in Starcrest Trust v.
Berry,72 imposed sanctions for a frivolous appeal under repealed
Rule 84 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure (now codified
as Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45).173 One of the reasons
for sanctions, along with a confusing and misleading brief and dis-
crepancies between the record and brief, was the failure of the Ap-
pellant to comply with the terms of a settlement mediated while
the case was pending on appeal.
174
The court in Garcia v. Mireles175 upheld a trial court's action in
striking a plaintiff's pleading and entering a take-nothing judgment
as a sanction for the failure of the plaintiff to appear for media-
tion.176 There, the trial court ordered the mediation after the plain-
tiff represented that there had been sufficient discovery to allow an
evaluation of the case, and that referral to mediation was appropri-
ate.177 The sanction was based on the trial court's inherent power
to control its docket. In affirming the sanction, the appellate court
noted that there was evidence that the plaintiff's failure to obey the
order for mediation was "willful or done with conscious indiffer-
168. Id.
169. See Wetherhold v. Mercado Mex. Cafe, 844 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1992, no writ) (holding that a client should not be sanctioned for failing to attend a
mediation that his counsel did not inform him of); see also Roberts v. Rose, 37 S.W.3d 31,
34-35 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no writ) (indicating that a client cannot be sanc-
tioned for failure to attend where it is determined that the attorney was at fault in failing to
maintain contact with the client).
170. 835 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
171. Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 140-41 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig.
proceeding).
172. 926 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
173. Starcrest Trust v. Berry, 926 S.W.2d 343, 356 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
174. Id.
175. 14 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
176. See Garcia v. Mireles, 14 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.)
(basing the decision on Koslow's v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1990)).
177. Id. at 840.
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ence."'178 "Given such a record, the sanction imposed by the trial
court [was] not inappropriate.'
'1 79
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Yang,181 similar sanctions
were reversed by the court when it found that "[t]here is no au-
thority presented that suggests the failure to mediate can be added
on top of one discovery failure to produce the egregious conduct
necessary for sanctions which preclude the presentation of the mer-
its of the case."18' Cases have also been dismissed on appeal for
failure to appear for scheduled mediation 182 and for refusal to
schedule a mediation as ordered by the court of appeals.
183
C. Sanctions for Leaving a Mediation Early
The issue of whether a person who attends a mediation can leave
the mediation before it is terminated and without permission of the
mediator was raised in In re Daley.184 The court of appeals deter-
mined that it was appropriate and not a violation of mediation con-
fidentiality'85 to order a deposition of Daley, a representative of
the defendant's insurer, who left a deposition before it concluded.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, re-
fused to issue a writ of mandamus and allowed the deposition to
take place.'86 The majority found no violation of the mediation
privilege: "[t]he statute is restricted to those matters occurring dur-
ing the 'settlement process.' Whether Daley left the mediation
178. Id. at 843.
179. Id.
180. No. 01-92-00726-CV, 1993 WL 166268 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] May 20,
1993, writ denied) (not designated for publication).
181. See FDIC v. Yang, No. 01-92-00726-CV, 1993 WL 166268, at *3 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] May 20, 1993, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (reversing
the trial court's ruling because "[t]he imposition of sanctions is within the discretion of the
trial court, but those sanctions must be just").
182. See Hockley v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., No. 14-98-00117-CV, 1999 WL 496991,
at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 15, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publica-
tion) (holding that because appellant failed to attend court-ordered mediation, dismissal
was the proper remedy).
183. See Bienek v. Exxon Corp., No. 14-98-00717-CV, 1999 WL 418344, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 24, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (grant-
ing appellee's motion to dismiss because appellant had cancelled scheduled mediation ses-
sions twice and ultimately failed to reschedule).
184. In re Daley, 29 S.W.3d 915, 918-19 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, orig.
proceeding).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 919.
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prior to its conclusion without the permission of the mediator is not
a matter related to the settlement process itself."'
18 7
The issue of whether a nonparty can be sanctioned for leaving a
mediation early was disposed of by the Daley court on a waiver
theory: "[Daley] voluntarily subjected himself to the jurisdiction of
the trial court ... [therefore, an objection] at a later date to the
mediation order... [is] to no avail. ' 188 The decision in Daley finds
support in a recent article by Maureen A. Weston, who concludes:
Parties who submit their dispute to the public judicial system have a
legitimate expectation of due process and fair treatment, provided
they comply with court orders and procedural rules of law. When
they are diverted, however temporarily, into court-connected media-
tion, the court has an obligation to protect that expectation as well as
the parties' financial, emotional, and intellectual investment in medi-
ation. Where courts offer or require parties to use court-connected
mediation, the court has some responsibility to prevent abuse of pro-
cess. Parties avail themselves of the benefits and protections of the
judicial system and unless they can persuade the court that a partici-
pation requirement should not apply to them, it is reasonable to re-
quire parties to comply with ADR conduct rules set forth by the
legislature and courts.189
In addition to the court's powers just discussed, mediators have
an inherent power to deal with recalcitrant participants that is not
often discussed.190 In a court-ordered mediation, it is the media-
187. Id. at 918.
188. Id. at 919.
189. Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality's Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial
Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
29, 79 (2003) (citations omitted); see also Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in
the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1805, 1806 (1995) (commenting on the
authority, both express and inherent, of courts to exercise control over many aspects of the
adjudication process).
190. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 604 So. 2d 1110, 1179
(Fla. 1992). The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide that:
The mediator may adjourn the mediation conference at any time and may set times for
reconvening the adjourned conference notwithstanding [R]ule 1.710(a). No further
notification is required for parties present at the adjourned conference.... The media-
tor shall at all times be in control of the mediation and the procedures to be followed
in the mediation. Counsel shall be permitted to communicate privately with their cli-
ents. In the discretion of the mediator and with the agreement of the parties, media-
tion may proceed in the absence of counsel unless otherwise ordered by the court.
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tor's responsibility to determine whether the mediation process has
succeeded, failed, or is still at work. If a participant insists upon
leaving the mediation before the mediator is satisfied that the me-
diation process has been exhausted, the mediator, at that point,
would report to the appointing court that the mediation has been
adjourned until the date set to recommence the mediation.
D. Failure to Bring Authority to Settle
The federal courts generally have broad power to manage pre-
trial proceedings,19 ' including the power to order parties to attend
pretrial mediations and settlement conferences and to bring along
settlement authority. As explained in G. Heileman Brewing Co.,
Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,192
In our view, "authority to settle," when used in the context of this
case, means that the "corporate representative" attending the pre-
trial conference was required to hold a position within the corporate
entity allowing him to speak definitively and to commit the corpora-
tion to a particular position in the litigation. We do not view "author-
ity to settle" as a requirement that corporate representatives must
come to court willing to settle on someone else's terms, but only that
they come to court in order to consider the possibility of
settlement. 1
93
Thus, in Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc.,194 the Eighth Circuit, rely-
ing upon Rule 16(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing mone-
tary sanctions "for failure to participate in good faith in court-or-
dered alternate dispute resolution (ADR) and imposing additional
sanctions for vexatiously increasing the costs of litigation.' 1 95 Gen-
erally, sanctions for failure to bring authority to a court-ordered
191. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 62-63 (1991) (stating that the power
to sanction granted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not limit a court's inherent
power to sanction for misconduct); Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (stating that an abuse of discretion standard applies to sanction for
party that ignored a court order).
192. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
193. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir.
1989).
194. 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001).
195. Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 592 (8th Cir. 2001).
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mediation have been approved. 19 6 However, the power to compel
attendance and to bring settlement authority to a mediation does
not include the power to compel a party to settle or to make an
offer of settlement.1
97
In Scaife v. Associated Air Center Inc.,19s the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals dealt with sanctions on both a party and the party's
attorney, for failing to appear for mediation. 99 The court acknowl-
edged, "[f]ederal courts have inherent powers [these inherent pow-
ers are to be distinguished from that power conferred by Rule 16(f)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] which include the author-
ity to sanction a party or attorney when necessary to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of their dockets. '20 0 However,
the court found the sanction ordered against the attorney to be
overbroad.201 The court noted that "[s]uch powers [to sanction]
may be exercised only if essential to preserve the authority of the
court and the sanction chosen must employ the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed. '20 2 The court also noted that
when imposed against an attorney, the sanction must be based
upon a finding of "bad faith.
20 3
In In re Stone,2 °4 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the
actions of the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas, placing in effect, standing orders requiring represent-
atives of the federal government with settlement authority to
appear at all settlement conferences. 20 5 The court of appeals held
that, while mandamus was an available remedy, the trial court had
inherent authority subject to an abuse of discretion standard, to
require any party including the government to have a representa-
196. See generally Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns
and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DisP.
RESOL. 367 (2002) (containing examples of sanctions that have been approved in federal
courts).
197. Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886, 890-93 (5th Cir. 1995).
198. 100 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 1996).
199. Scaife v. Associated Air Center Inc., 100 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 1996).
200. Id. at 411.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 412; see also Chaves v. MA' Medina Star, 47 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)
("In order to impose sanctions against an attorney under its inherent power, a court must
make a specific finding that the attorney acted in 'bad faith.').
204. 986 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1993).
205. In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 1993).
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tive with settlement authority present.2 °6 The appellate court
found that the standing order constituted an abuse of discretion.0 7
The court did not prohibit such an order in every case, but indi-
cated that the trial court should enter such an order only after con-
sidering less drastic steps.2 °8
In In re United States,209 the district court ordered:
[T]hat each party be represented during the entire mediation process
by "an executive officer (other than in-house counsel) with authority
to negotiate a settlement (the authority required shall be active, i.e.,
not merely the authority to observe the mediation proceedings but
the authority to negotiate, demand or offer, and bind the party
represented).21°
The Fifth Circuit denied the writ of mandamus filed in an effort
to overturn this order.21 1 The court did so with reservations:
Because we find that the district court has not abused its discre-
tion, we deny the Government's petition for a writ of mandamus.
However, we request that the district court consider alternatively or-
dering the Government to have the person or persons identified as
holding full settlement authority consider settlement in advance of
the mediation and be fully prepared and available by telephone to
discuss settlement at the time of the mediation.212
In a concurring opinion, Justice Dennis noted that this case was
different from the Stone case because: "(a) it is an exceptional case
rather than routine litigation; (b) it involves specifically ordered
mediation rather than a standing order or an ordinary pretrial set-
tlement conference; and [(c)] the government agreed to media-
tion. "213 The practical problem with ordering a party to appear
with settlement authority is the impossibility of determining what
that authority should be. At most, courts should only order the
attendance of the person having the power to determine whether
there should be a settlement.
206. Id. at 900.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 905.
209. 149 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1998).
210. In re United States, 149 F.3d 332, 333 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998).
211. Id.
212. Id. (citation omitted).
213. See id. at 333-34 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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E. Failure to Pay Settlement or Attempt to Repudiate the
Agreement
Sanctions are not available for the failure of a party to pay
amounts owed pursuant to a settlement agreement within a reason-
able time.214
There is no evidence that appellants mediated in bad faith, and the
[R~ule 11 [TEx. R. Civ. P. 11] agreement gave appellees rights that
they would not have had absent the agreement. A breach of a settle-
ment contract after mediation is no different than a breach of a set-
tlement agreement without mediation. Mediation is a creative
method for dispute resolution and is not another forum to obtain
sanctions. Appellants' conduct, although not laudatory, was at worst
a breach of an implied contract term concerning reasonably prompt
payment.... A breach of contract has never been a ground for judi-
cial sanctions, and it is not one now.
2 1 5
The court in Rizk v. Millard216 seems to agree.2 17 "Repudiation
of an unsigned settlement agreement forged in mediation is not
subject to discovery sanctions under [Rule 215 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure]. The options available to a party are either fil-
ing suit on the agreement asserting that it is a valid agreement, or
continuing with the original suit.
'218
The failure to comply with a mediated settlement agreement
reached on appeal as a result of a mediation ordered by the court
of appeals is not a basis for dismissal of the appeal for failure to
prosecute.219 The "enforcement of a disputed settlement agree-
ment, even if reached while the action is on appeal, must be deter-
mined in a breach of contract cause of action under normal rules of
pleading and evidence.
'220
214. Island Entm't v. Castaneda, 882 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ denied).
215. Id. at 5.
216. 810 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
217. Rizk v. Millard, 810 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no
writ).
218. Id.
219. See Bauer v. Jasso, 946 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no
writ) (noting that the court could find no authority supporting when the failure to comply
with the terms of a mediated settlement agreement was a valid basis for dismissal of an
appeal for want of prosecution).
220. See id. (relying upon Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.
1996)). It is yet to be seen whether Mantas will be applied to trial court actions. Id.; see
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A corollary to the prohibition against sanctions for the failure to
pay settlements is that sanctions may not be imposed for attempts
to repudiate a settlement agreement. In Hall v. Hall,22 1 one
spouse, Diane Hall, sought to repudiate a mediated settlement
agreement containing the language provided, in section 6.602 of
the Texas Family Code, precluding repudiation of the agreement.22
The trial court sanctioned the spouse for this attempt to repudi-
ate.223 The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed the sanction by finding
that it presumed her attorney acted in good faith and there was no
evidence that "Diane Hall engaged in unique conduct separate
from her attorney's representation," and thus, "the trial court erred
in granting Jack Hall's motion for sanctions against Diane Hall
alone.
' 224
F. Abatement Where Agreement Is Repudiated
It may be improper to proceed with the main action where a
mediated settlement agreement has been repudiated. This is cer-
tainly so where the mediation takes place after judgment and while
the case is on appeal.2 5 This is precisely what occurred in Mantas
v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 26 where the appellate court, during a
mandamus proceeding, stated that "where the dispute arises while
the underlying action is on appeal ... the party seeking enforce-
ment must file a separate breach of contract action. ' 227 It was not
an abuse of the appellate court's discretion to refuse to enforce the
settlement agreement, because a party to the settlement agreement
had revoked his consent to the settlement before the court of ap-
peals dismissed the suit in accordance with the agreement.228 The
also Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, No. 03-97-00323-CV, 1997 WL 420780, at *1 (Tex. App.-
Austin July 24, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication) (rejecting appellant's argu-
ment that he did not timely perfect his motion for a new trial because he was in the midst
of mediation).
221. No. 12-03-00417-CV, 2005 WL 1000619 (Tex. App.-Tyler Apr. 29, 2005, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
222. Hall v. Hall, No. 12-03-00417-CV, 2005 WL 1000619, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Tyler
Apr. 29, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.).
223. Id. at *2.
224. Id. at *5.
225. Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1996).
226. 925 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1996).




reasoning of the court would seem to apply to a proceeding in the
trial court; at least where the entire matter is settled by the
agreement.
It makes no sense for the court of appeals to expend its re-
sources, and require the parties to expend theirs, on an appeal that
may be moot. "Certainly, a ruling on the merits of the appeal
before judgment is rendered in the enforcement suit would inject
needless uncertainty and confusion into the issues surrounding the
settlement.
'229
G. An Order for Mediation Is Interlocutory; An Order of
Dismissal for Failure to Mediate Is Final
Logically, an order referring a case to mediation does not dis-
pose of the parties or the underlying claims, and thus, is not a final
order. In short, an order for mediation is an unappealable interloc-
utory order.23° However, an order dismissing a plaintiff's case for
failing to participate in, and be personally present at a court-or-
dered mediation is a final order, requiring a timely appeal. 231 This
is so whether the order is viewed as a dismissal for want of prosecu-
tion under Rule 165(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or as
a sanction.232 In Lucas v. Best Pest Control,233 the plaintiff's attor-
ney timely filed a motion to reinstate, but failed to timely perfect
an appeal under Rule 26.1(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure after that motion was overruled.234 Thus, the
appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the questions
raised.235
229. Id.
230. Coleman v. GM Auto. Repair Serv., No. 04-98-01013-CV, 1999 WL 62364, at *1
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Feb. 10, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication); see
Materials Evolution Dev. USA, Inc. v. Jablonowski, 949 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1997, no writ) (stating that "an order compelling arbitration is an unappealable
interlocutory order").
231. See Lucas v. Best Pest Control, No. 03-98-00511-CV, 2000 WL 13103, at *2 (Tex.
App.-Austin Jan. 6, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (allowing the trial
judge's dismissal of the case due to plaintiff's failure to participate in court-ordered
mediation).
232. Id. at *3.
233. No. 03-98-00511-CV, 2000 WL 13103 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 6, 2000, no pet.).
234. Lucas v. Best Pest Control, No. 03-98-00511-CV, 2000 WL 13103, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Austin Jan. 6, 2000, no pet.).
235. Id.
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H. Failure to File a Mediation Docketing Statement on Appeal
The failure to comply with an appellate court order to file a me-
diation docketing statement may result in the dismissal of an
appeal.2 36
I. Misconduct at a Mediation Possibly Constructive Contempt'
Possibly a Sanction; Notice of Contempt Hearing Is
Required
Violations of mediation orders "would necessarily [be] for con-
structive contempt, not direct contempt, because any violation oc-
curred outside the court's presence. '237 If it is alleged that a party
has been guilty of misconduct at a mediation and the trial court
seeks to hear evidence on the subject, the party is entitled to full
due process, including notice served personally upon the contem-
nor.238 A reasonable time before the hearing requires no less than
three days notice. 239 Further, if the violation of the mediation or-
der is treated as a sanction proceeding, the proceeding must still
comport with "due process of notice and hearing. "240
J. Death Penalty Sanctions Must Comply with TransAmerican
It is improper to enter a sanction for mediation abuse that orders
the striking of a party's pleading, without complying with the pro-
236. See generally Becerra v. Rohan, No. 14-99-00254-CV, 1999 WL 516257, at *1
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 22, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(dismissing an appeal for appellant's failure to timely file a mediation docketing state-
ment); Kotov v. Kotov, No. 14-98-01429-CV, 1999 WL 516246 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] July 22, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (dismissing appeal for appel-
lants' failure to timely file a mediation docketing statement); Whatley v. Slattery, No. 14-
99-00553-CV, 1999 WL 516281 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 22, 1999, no pet.)
(not designated for publication) (dismissing appeal for appellant's failure to timely file a
mediation docketing statement); O'Brien v. Waldroff, No. 14-98-01383-CV, 1999 WL
548330 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 29, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publi-
cation) (dismissing an appeal for failure to abide by the court's order).
237. In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 449 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig.
proceeding).
238. See Ex parte Herring, 438 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. 1969) (discharging the petitioner
from confinement for contempt because he was not personally served with process, thus
violating his right to due process).
239. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 21 (describing a reasonable time for filing and serving plead-
ings and motions).
240. In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d at 451.
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cedure outlined in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell.24 1
The court in Wal-Mart v. Butler2 42 offered an excellent examination
of the procedures established by TransAmerican.243
First, there must be a direct relationship between the offensive con-
duct and the sanction. Second, the sanction must not be exces-
sive.... Although TransAmerican was a discovery sanction case, this
[c]ourt has applied the same standards in determining whether death
penalty sanctions were appropriate following violations of a pretrial
order.... Because the trial court did not [first test lesser sanctions],
we conclude it abused its discretion in striking Wal-Mart's answer,
2 44




1. The Question Raised by Ames
246
A split of authority arose concerning the effect of section 154.071
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides in
part, that "[i]f the parties reach a settlement and execute a written
241. See 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (detailing the
procedure for determining whether court-imposed sanctions comply with either
paragraphs 2(b) or 3 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as being just).
242. 41 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
243. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Butler, 41 S.W.3d 816, 817-18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001,
no pet.).
244. Id. (citation omitted). The court applied the rule set out by the Texas Supreme
Court in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell when dealing with sanctions levied by
a trial court. TransAm. Natural Gas Corp., 811 S.W.2d at 917; see also Ameri-First Fin.
Corp. v. Benemax Employee Leasing, Inc., No. 05-01-00663-CV, 2002 WL 216123, at *2
(Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 13, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (discussing the
failure of a party to appear at a mediation ordered by the appellate court).
245. See generally Allison Ma'luf, A Mediation Nightmare?: The Effect of the North
Carolina Supreme Court's Decision in Chappell v. Roth on the Enforceability and Integrity
of Mediated Settlement Agreements, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643 (2002) (describing the
reasoning behind the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in Chappell v. Roth when
dealing with mediated settlement agreements, as well as describing the mediation process
as it is applied in North Carolina). The above sources are provided to give the experience
of another state in dealing with the repudiation of mediated settlement agreements.
246. See George B. Murr, In the Matter of Marriage of Ames and the Enforceability of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreements: A Case for Reform, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 31,
35 (1997) (arguing for a change in the statute to conform to the Ames decision).
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agreement disposing of the dispute, the agreement is enforceable
in the same manner as any other written contract.
247
In In re Marriage of Ames,2 48 the court held that settlement
agreements reached through court-ordered mediation may not be
unilaterally repudiated.249 Ames was followed by In re Marriage of
Banks.250 However, the same court, deciding In re Marriage of Mc-
Intosh, 5' made it clear that the Ames holding only applied to prop-
erly negotiated, completed settlement agreements. 2  There, the
parties, but not their attorneys, attended the mediation. 3 The me-
diated agreement specifically provided that the parties agreed to
take the agreement to their attorneys for review.254 The trial court
refused to enforce the agreement over the objection of one of the
parties. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that this was noth-
ing more than "uncounseled, preliminary offers or proposals, the
acceptance of which were conditioned upon review by legal coun-
sel and later finalization. 2 55 The court distinguished Ames with
this language: "[t]here, the existence of a binding agreement was
presupposed. Indeed, both parties and their counsel had consented
or accepted the agreement before one unilaterally attempted to re-
ject it."'256 The problem with Ames was the failure of the Amarillo
court to recognize the rule established in Burnaman v. Heaton,257
requiring that under Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
247. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.071 (Vernon 2005). Further, the
Code states: "(b) The court in its discretion may incorporate the terms of the agreement in
the court's final decree disposing of the case. (c) A settlement agreement does not affect an
outstanding court order unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into a subse-
quent decree." Id.
248. 860 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
249. In re Marriage of Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no
writ).
250. 887 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ) (stating that "[n]o
party to a dispute can be forced to settle the conflict outside of court; but if a voluntary
agreement that disposes of the agreement is reached, the parties should be required to
honor the agreement").
251. 918 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ).
252. In re Marriage of McIntosh, 918 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no
writ) (citing Williford Energy Co. v. Submergible Cable Serv., Inc., 895 S.W.2d 379, 384
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ)).
253. Id.
254. In re Marriage of Ames, 860 S.W.2d at 591.
255. Id.
256. In re Marriage of McIntosh, 918 S.W.2d at 88.
257. 150 Tex. 33, 240 S.W.2d 288 (1951).
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consent to an agreed judgment must exist at the time the judgment
is entered.2
2. Ames Rejected
A number of other courts of appeals refused to support the entry
of agreed judgments based on repudiated mediated settlement
agreements (repudiated before the agreed judgment could be en-
tered).25 9 Generally, these courts agree that the mediated agree-
ment is still enforceable as a contract.26 °
We do not determine whether Clopton may repudiate the settlement
agreement. Clopton's withdrawing his consent to entry of a judg-
ment does not necessarily make the settlement agreement unen-
forceable.... A party can enforce the agreement even though the
other party has withdrawn consent to the judgment. However, the
party seeking to enforce the agreement must provide proper plead-
ing and proof to support enforcing the settlement agreement under
contract law.26'
The Amarillo Court of Appeals in Ames concluded that several
cases applying Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were
"inapplicable to agreements reached pursuant to alternative dis-
pute resolution procedures described in chapter 154 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. ' 262 The courts above, in re-
jecting Ames, relied upon the same line of cases distinguished by
Ames.
258. Burnaman v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333, 240 S.W.2d 288, 291 (1951); see also Middle-
ton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1985) (requiring an objection to preserve error
after an agreement has been withdrawn by a party); Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528
(Tex. 1984) (reaffirming the decision in Burnaman); Leal v. Cortez, 569 S.W.2d 536, 541
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (noting that the trial court had no power to
charge or alter the agreement of the parties when entering an agreed judgment).
259. See Clopton v. Mountain Peak Water Supply Corp., 911 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1995, no writ) (rejecting Ames); Cary v. Cary, 894 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (rejecting Ames).
260. Clopton, 911 S.W.2d at 527 (citing TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.071(a) (Vernon 1995)); Cary, 894 S.W.2d at 112 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154.071(a) (Vernon 1995)).
261. Clopton, 911 S.W.2d at 527 (citations omitted) (quoting Stevens v. Snyder, 874
S.W.2d 241, 244 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied)).
262. In re Marriage of Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590, 592 n.1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no
writ) (citing Burnaman v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333, 240 S.W.2d 288 (1951); Vineyard v. Wilson,
597 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ)); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 11 (noting that a
consent judgment cannot be entered unless consent exists at the time of the judgment).
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Stevens v. Snyder 63 provides the rationale for a suit to enforce a
mediated settlement agreement where consent is withdrawn.264
The court stated:
Once a party accepts a settlement offer, he cannot withdraw from the
agreement arbitrarily. Once a party accepts the agreement, enforce-
ment is by suit upon the contract, either for breach or for specific
performance. The party seeking enforcement of the settlement
agreement must support it by pleadings and proof.
2 65
The Texas Supreme Court, in Padilla v. LaFrance,266 a case in-
volving a settlement agreement but not involving a mediated
agreement, reiterated the underlying principles.267
Although a court cannot render a valid agreed judgment absent con-
sent at the time it is rendered, this does not preclude the court, after
proper notice and hearing, from enforcing a settlement agreement
complying with Rule 11 even though one side no longer consents to
the settlement. The judgment in the latter case is not an agreed judg-
ment, but rather is a judgment enforcing a binding contract.268
Because the settlement agreement in Padilla did not result from
mediation, the express issue presented by Ames was not before the
court, nor were the questions raised by Ames directly answered by
Padilla. Other courts' decisions expressly rejecting the Ames rea-
soning include the cases discussed below.
In Martin v. Black,269 the plaintiff raised an issue concerning
whether the parties intended the mediated agreement to be bind-
ing.270 Because the plaintiff denied that a binding agreement ex-
263. 874 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
264. See Stevens v. Snyder, 874 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied)
(relying upon Ortega-Carter v. Am. Int'l Adjustment Co., 834 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1992, writ denied), and Browning v. Holloway, 620 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
265. Stevens, 874 S.W.2d at 243; see also In re Marriage of Allen, No. 07-96-0195-CV,
1996 WL 686895, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Nov. 27, 1996, no writ) (not designated for
publication) (stating that a party seeking enforcement must plead and prove the agree-
ment, see that it is filed with the court, and must also request that the trial court enforce
the agreement).
266. 907 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1995).
267. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. 1995).
268. Id.
269. 909 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied).




isted, the defendant's motion to enforce the mediated settlement
agreement was found to be insufficient to authorize summary en-
forcement of the settlement. 271 Along the way, the court stated:
Because a mediated settlement agreement is enforceable under
contract law, then the same procedures used to enforce and enter
judgment on other contracts should apply to mediated settlement
agreements. When the legislature enacted the ADR statute, it did
not order the courts to follow a special procedure applicable only to
mediated settlement agreements.272
In Cadle Co. v. Castle,273 Justice Ovard, writing for the majority
of the court, en banc, concluded the following:2 74
In considering the plain language of section 154.071(b), we do not
find support for the argument that the legislature intended to create
a "summary" proceeding for enforcement of written settlement
agreements. Further, we believe there is another, more reasonable,
explanation for the adoption of section 154.071(b). . . . [S]ection
154.071(b) was intended to give a trial judge the discretion to either
include, or exclude, terms of the written settlement agreement when
entering judgment.275
Relying on out-of-state authority, Justice James, joined by Justice
Wright, dissented from the en banc decision, concluding that "it is
proper for a trial court to enforce a mediated settlement agreement
through a summary proceeding, and, after notice and hearing, to
incorporate the terms of the agreement in the court's final decree
disposing of the case. ' 276 The dissent, however, agreed that the
trial judge did not render judgment pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.277
271. Id. at 195.
272. Id. Martin v. Black is now cited for the proposition that "[a] mediated settlement
agreement is enforceable in the same manner as any other contract." Hardman v. Dault, 2
S.W.3d 378, 380 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
273. 913 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) (en banc).
274. Cadle Co. v. Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627, 631-32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ de-
nied) (en banc).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 641 (James, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
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Davis v. Wickham, 278 following Martin v. Black, rejected the trial
court action.279 The court reasoned that Martin did not comply
with Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 ° The court
also refused to treat the trial court action as an attempt to enforce
the agreement as a contract, citing Padilla: "[a]n action to enforce a
settlement agreement, where consent is withdrawn, must be based
on proper pleading and proof."
281
In Economy Gas, Inc. v. Burke,a82 the court noted that "the
proper method for enforcing a mediated settlement agreement is
either by motion for summary judgment or trial on the merits.
283
The Texas Supreme Court, in Mantas v. Fifth Court of Ap-
peals,284 seems to have settled any doubt concerning the Ames
questions that might have remained after Padilla.285 There, while
the judgment was on appeal, appellant, Mantas, paid $160,000 pur-
suant to a mediated settlement agreement, which was to constitute
full satisfaction of the judgment.286 However, before the settle-
ment papers could be filed with the court of appeals, the appellee,
"Barnett, withdrew his consent to the settlement, revoking
Manta[s's] authority to file the settlement documents on Barnett's
behalf. ' 287 The court of appeals refused to enforce the settlement
agreement.288 The Texas Supreme Court agreed that, "[b]ecause
Barnett revoked his consent to the settlement before the court of
appeals dismissed the appeal in accordance with the agreement,
278. 917 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
279. Davis v. Wickham, 917 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996,
no writ).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 416 (citing Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461-62 (Tex. 1995)); Econ.
Gas, Inc. v. Burke, No. 14-93-01016-CV, 1996 WL 220903, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] May 2, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (citing Padilla, 907
S.W.2d at 461-62).
282. No. 14-93-01016-CV, 1996 WL 220903 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 2,
1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication).
283. Econ. Gas, Inc. v. Burke, No. 14-93-01016-CV, 1996 WL 220903, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 2, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication).
284. 925 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
285. Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceed-
ing). The phrase "seems to have settled," must be used because Ames is not cited or dis-
cussed in the opinion. Id. The result in Mantas, however, is inconsistent with Ames and
thus appears to reject Ames by implication. Id.





the court correctly determined that Mantas was required to seek
enforcement in a separate suit. '289 The court outlined the proce-
dure to be followed:
Thus, the party seeking enforcement must pursue a separate breach-
of-contract claim, which is subject to the normal rules of pleading
and proof. Where the settlement dispute arises while the trial court
has jurisdiction over the underlying action, a claim to enforce the
settlement agreement should, if possible, be asserted in that court
under the original cause number. However, where the dispute arises
while the underlying action is on appeal, as in this case, the party
seeking enforcement must file a separate breach of contract
action.' 9°
The Texas Supreme Court in Mantas nevertheless issued a writ
of mandamus to compel the court of appeals to abate the appeal,
pending resolution of the enforcement suit.
291
In Pollard v. Merkel,292 the Dallas Court of Appeals followed the
decision in Cadle Co. v. Castle.293 It held that it was improper to
enter an agreed judgment upon a mediated settlement agreement
where the settlement had been repudiated before the judgment
could be entered.294 Such a case must be determined in a breach of
contract action under normal rules of pleading and proof.295 The
court concluded that a motion for judgment seeking to enforce the
parties' settlement agreement was, as in Cadle, insufficient to plead
a separate and distinct breach of contract claim.296
289. Id. at 659.
290. Mantas, 925 S.W.2d at 658-59 (citation omitted).
291. Id. at 659.
292. No. 05-96-00795-CV, 1999 WL 72209, (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 12, 1999, no. pet.)
(not designated for publication).
293. Pollard v. Merkel, No. 05-96-00795-CV, 1999 WL 72209, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las Feb. 12, 1999, no. pet.) (not designated for publication).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.; accord Alcantar v. Okla. Nat'l Bank, 47 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2001, no pet.) (stating that "once consent is withdrawn, an action to enforce a settle-
ment agreement must be based on proper pleading and proof"); Alvarez v. Martinez, No.
04-99-00770-CV, 2000 WL 1585653, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 25, 2000, no pet.)
(not designated for publication) (stating that "[t]he settlement agreement alone is insuffi-
cient to provide a basis for judgment because it would deprive a party of the right to be
confronted by appropriate pleadings, assert defenses, conduct discovery, and submit con-
tested fact issues to a judge or jury").
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Pfeiffer v. Newman2 9 7 rejected an argument that the settlement
agreement amounted to an enforceable stipulation.298 The court of
appeals reasoned that:
[T]here is a distinction between a stipulation and a contract between
individuals. A stipulation is a type of contract between the parties,
and also between the parties and the court. Clearly, if the court is
party to the contract, then the court is bound to it like any other
party. However, a settlement agreement is not a contract between
the parties and the court, but rather it is an agreement only between
the parties. Thus, the trial court cannot be said to be bound by a
settlement agreement in such a way that the court is inescapably re-
quired to render judgment on the agreement.2 99
The San Antonio Court of Appeals, in Garcia v. Walace,3"
stated that the generally accepted interpretation of Padilla is that
once consent is withdrawn, no agreed judgment can be entered, but
that once the proponent of the settlement agreement amends the
pleadings to allege the agreement and its breach, it is appropriate
for the trial court to enter summary judgment ordering specific
performance of the agreement. 30 1 The court noted:
[T]he judgment against the Garcias [who renounced the agreement]
is not an agreed or consent judgment. Rather, the judgment against
the Garcias is a judgment for breach of a binding and enforceable
contract-the Mediation Settlement Agreement. Accordingly,
whether the Garcias withdrew their consent to the settlement agree-
ment before a consent judgment was rendered is immaterial to the
propriety of the trial court's judgment.3 °2
The language in Mantas, indicating that a second suit might be
required, was exposed and discussed in Antonini v. Harris County
297. No. 07-97-0265-CV, 1998 WL 483458 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Aug. 18, 1998, no
pet.) (not designated for publication).
298. Pfeiffer v. Newman, No. 07-97-0265-CV, 1998 WL 483458, at *1 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo Aug. 18, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
299. Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
300. No. 04-98-00066-CV, 1999 WL 391846 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 16, 1999,
no pet.) (not designated for publication).
301. Garcia v. Wallace, No. 04-98-00066-CV, 1999 WL 391846, at *2 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio June 16, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
302. Id. (citation omitted); accord Pfeiffer, 1998 WL 483458, at *1 (stating that the
"trial court can ... enforce a settlement agreement even though one party no longer con-
sents to the settlement" (citation omitted)).
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Appraisal District,30 3 which poses a potential trap.304  In short,
there is a danger of preclusion in filing a second suit. In Mantas,
the second suit was necessary because the original action was on
appeal.3 °5 However, in Antonini that was not the case. Instead,
Mr. Antonini failed to file the breach of contract action in the orig-
inal action, but asserted it in subsequent suits, and was precluded
by the final judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution in the
second action.30 6 No motion to reinstate was filed in a subsequent
case; instead, Antonini brought a new action in another court
where he alleged that the District breached a settlement agreement
in the 1989 case.30 7 In the alternative, Antonini sought a bill of
review to reinstate the 1989 case, and to require specific perform-
ance of the proposed agreed judgment.30 8 Subsequently, Antonini
filed a third suit "seeking specific performance or damages for [the
District's] alleged breach of the proposed agreed judgment in the
1989 case. '3 9 The second case was tried before the court, but at
the close of evidence, Antonini "took a nonsuit on the breach of
contract claim[,]" and a judgment was entered denying all of
Antonini's claims.310 The third case was tried several weeks later
and judgment was entered that Antonini take nothing.311 On ap-
peal, the court held that the settlement agreement was not enforce-
able because Antonini did not seek to enforce the agreement in the
original 1989 case. 12
It was "possible" to file the papers and hear the breach of contract
case in the 1989 case, but it was not done. After appellant allowed
the 1989 case to be dismissed for want of prosecution, he did not file
a motion to reinstate the case nor appeal the dismissal. Because ap-
pellant failed to comply with [R]ule 11 and Padilla, and [he] had op-
303. 999 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
304. See Antonini v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 999 S.W.2d 608, 614-15 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (identifying that the breach of contract claim in
the first suit is the same as in the subject suit, thereby barring the breach of contract claim
due to res judicata).
305. Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding).
306. Antonini, 999 S.W.2d at 614-15.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 609-10.
309. Id. at 610.
310. Id.
311. Antonini, 999 S.W.2d at 610.
312. Id. at 613.
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portunity to assert his breach of contract action in the 1989 case
under the original cause number, [the court of appeals found that]
the trial court correctly concluded that the settlement agreement was
not enforceable.313
When the trial court retains jurisdiction of the case at the time the
settlement dispute arises, the complaining party must amend the
pleadings to raise the breach of the settlement agreement.
Where the settlement dispute arises while the trial court has jurisdic-
tion over the underlying action, a claim to enforce the settlement
agreement should be asserted in that court under the original cause
number, such as through an amended pleading or counterclaim. The
settlement agreement alone is insufficient to provide a basis for judg-
ment because it would deprive a party of the right to be confronted
by appropriate pleadings, assert defenses, conduct discovery, and
submit contested fact issues to a judge or jury.314
The law, as it now stands, is summed up in Anderton v. Schin-
dler,315 a recent decision by the Dallas Court of Appeals.31 6
The decision of whether a mediated settlement agreement is en-
forceable is determined in the same manner as any other written
contract. An agreement is enforceable if it is "complete within itself
in every material detail, and ... contains all of the essential elements
of the agreement." The intent of the parties to be bound is an essen-
tial element of an enforceable contract, and is generally a question of
fact. However, where that intent is clear and unambiguous on the
face of the agreement, it may be determined as matter of law.
"[A] contract must be sufficiently definite in its terms so that a
court can understand what the promisor undertook." If an alleged
agreement is so indefinite as to make it impossible for a court to fix
the legal obligations and liabilities of the parties, it cannot constitute
an enforceable contract. In order for a court to enforce a contract,
the parties must agree to the material terms of the contract. To be
legally binding, the parties must have a meeting of the minds and
must communicate consent to the terms of the agreement.317
313. Id.
314. Alvarez v. Martinez, No. 04-99-00770-CV, 2000 WL 1585653, at *1 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio Oct. 25, 2000, no pet.) (citations omitted). The court in this case reversed a
summary judgment for the complaining party, because the complainant had failed to plead
the breach of the settlement agreement. Id. at *2.
315. 154 S.W.3d 928 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
316. Anderton v. Schindler, 154 S.W.3d 928 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
317. Id. at 932 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 37:325
MEDIATION IN TEXAS
3. Special Considerations in Suits Affecting the Parent-Child
Relationship
The Texas Family Code, section 153.0071,318 was the first statute
to apply specifically to the revocation of mediated settlement
agreements in suits affecting the parent-child relationship.319
Under the Code:
A mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the
agreement:
(1) provides in a separate paragraph an underlined statement that
the agreement is not subject to revocation;
(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and
(3) is signed by the party's attorney, if any, who is present at the
time the agreement is signed.32 °
Under section 153.0071(e) of the Texas Family Code, "[i]f a medi-
ated agreement meets the requirements of [s]ubsection (d), a party
is entitled to judgment on the mediated settlement agreement not-
withstanding Rule 11.
' 321
In Spinks v. Spinks,322 the parties to a divorce entered into a
mediated settlement agreement that affected the parent-child rela-
tionship.323 While the agreement "contained a statement in a sepa-
rate paragraph that the parties stipulated and agreed that the
agreement was not subject to revocation[,]" this statement was not
underlined, although it did appear in all capital letters.324 "At trial,
the appellant repudiated the agreement. ' 325 Nevertheless, the trial
318. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(d) (Vernon 2002).
319. See Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161, 165 n.6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied) (recognizing this fact). Note that:
Prior to enactment of section 153.0071 in 1995, settlement agreements in family law
cases were governed by Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapter 154 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and general contract law. From Septem-
ber 1, 1995 until August 31, 1997, section 153.0071(f) of the Texas Family Code applied
to mediated settlement agreements in divorce proceedings. Effective September 1,
1997, section 153.0071(f) was repealed and replaced with section 6.602.
Id. (citations omitted).
320. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(d) (Vernon 2002).
321. Id. § 153.0071(e).
322. 939 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
323. Spinks v. Spinks, 939 S.W.2d 229, 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no
writ).
324. Id. at 230.
325. Id.
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court "rendered a decree of divorce based on the mediated settle-
ment agreement with a few modifications. "326 The court of appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that "[the] judgment is clearly not
a traditional consent judgment because appellant withdrew her
consent before rendition. Moreover, the requirements for
non[ ]revocation provided by section 153.0071(d) were not met be-
cause the stipulation by the parties that the agreement was
non[ ]revocable was not underlined.
327
In Glover v. Brazoria County Children's Protective Services
Unit,328 custody was determined by a mediated settlement agree-
ment.329 The father "agreed that if he did not comply with the five
requirements [in the agreement,] he 'acknowledges that he does
not need to have his children returned to him.' The trial court later
approved the settlement agreement[,] ' 3 ° but the father "failed to
comply fully" with two of the requirements to which he had
agreed.331 On motion of the Brazoria County Children's Protective
Services Unit and the Texas Department of Protective and Regula-
tory Services, "the trial court terminated [the father's] parental
rights by rendering a final summary judgment. '332 However, the
trial court's judgment was reversed on appeal.333 The court of ap-
peals found that the father had not "stipulated in the settlement
agreement that a termination of his parental rights would be in the
best interest of the children. ' 334 The court concluded that "[i]n
light of the severe nature of involuntary termination of parental
rights and the constitutional ramifications of such action," it was
"unwilling to construe the language of the settlement agreement
broadly to reach such a result.
335
The court in Glover did not "reach the question of whether a
parent's prospective agreement that it would be in the best interest
of the child to terminate the parent's parental rights on the occur-
326. Id.
327. Id. (citations omitted).
328. 916 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
329. Glover v. Brazoria County Children's Protective Serv. Unit, 916 S.W.2d 19, 19
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
330. Id. at 20.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 21.




rence of some future event would establish as a matter of law the
best-interest element of involuntary termination." '336 However, in
Garcia-Udall v. Udall,337 the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded
that, absent a finding that the agreement was either illegal or viola-
tive of public policy, "the trial court had no discretion to enter
judgment that varied from the terms of the mediated settlement
agreement.
338
The current provision for enforcement of mediated settlement
agreements is found in section 6.602 of the Texas Family Code,
which provides that:
(a) On the written agreement of the parties or on the court's own
motion, the court may refer a suit for dissolution of a marriage to
mediation.
(b) A mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the
agreement:
(1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in bold-
faced type or capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is
not subject to revocation;
(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and
(3) is signed by the party's attorney, if any, who is present at the
time the agreement is signed.
(c) If a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements of
this section, a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated settle-
ment agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, or another rule of law.
(d) A party may at any time prior to the final mediation order file a
written objection to the referral of a suit for dissolution of a marriage
to mediation on the basis of family violence having been committed
against the objecting party by the other party. After an objection is
filed, the suit may not be referred to mediation unless, on the request
of the other party, a hearing is held and the court finds that a pre-
ponderance of the evidence does not support the objection. If the
suit is referred to mediation, the court shall order appropriate mea-
sures be taken to ensure the physical and emotional safety of the
party who filed the objection. The order shall provide that the par-
336. Id. at 21 n.3.
337. 141 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
338. Garcia-Udall v. Udall, 141 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
But see Glover, 916 S.W.2d at 21 (identifying that the court did not enforce the mediated
settlement agreement in that case due to the potential harsh outcome).
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ties not be required to have face-to-face contact and that the parties
be placed in separate rooms during mediation.339
Under this provision, which the parties must enter into volunta-
rily 340 with the aid of a mediator,341 an agreement that complies
with section 6.602 of the Texas Family Code may be enforced by
the family court without a determination that the agreement is
"just and right," as generally required by section 7.006 of the Texas
Family Code.342
[T]he language of section 6.602 reflects that when the [l]egislature
enacted that section, it definitely and deliberately created a procedu-
ral shortcut for enforcement of mediated settlement agreements in
divorce cases. Equally apparent is that section 6.602 does not con-
flict with, but is an exception to, section 7.006. We are similarly per-
suaded that section 6.602 is also an exception to sections 7.001 and
7.006 in allowing a judgment to be entered on a section 6.602 agree-
ment without a determination by the trial court that the terms of the
agreement are just and right. Importantly, however, section 6.602
cannot be imposed on parties against their wishes. Rather, they re-
main free to enter mediated settlement agreements that do not fall
within section 6.602 and, in fact, must take affirmative steps to qual-
ify for section 6.602 treatment.343
Stated another way, "[u]nilateral withdrawal of consent does not
S.. negate the enforceability of a mediated settlement agreement
339. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
340. Domangue v. Domangue, No. 12-04-00029-CV, 2005 WL 1828553, at *2 (Tex.
App.-Tyler Aug. 3, 2005, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). The decision emphasized the voluntary
nature of such an agreement; the court also noted that the mandatory enforcement provi-
sions may be easily avoided because "[b]oth parties to the instant agreement were free to
enter into a mediated settlement agreement not governed by section 6.602." Id.
341. Lee v. Lee, 158 S.W.3d 612, 613-14 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). The
Lee court stated:
Given that section 7.006(a) of the Texas Family Code, which has been in force for
many years, already allows divorcing parties to enter into written agreements without
requiring mediation concerning the division of the community assets and liabilities as
well as spousal maintenance, we decline to carve a common-law exception into section
6.602(b) that allows an unmediated settlement agreement to morph into a mediated
settlement agreement based on mere form. We hold that a mediated settlement
agreement necessarily requires mediation and a mediator.
Id.
342. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006 (Vernon 1998).




in a divorce proceeding, and a separate suit for enforcement of a
contract is not necessary.
344
The Waco Court of Appeals has held that there must be compli-
ance with both subsections 6.602(a) and 6.602(b) of the Texas Fam-
ily Code before the mediated settlement agreement becomes
enforceable.345 In other words, the mediated settlement agreement
must occur as a result of a court-ordered mediation. The court rec-
ognized that its holding was facially inconsistent with three other
decisions and identifies that the decisions from the other courts
were interpreting section 153.0071 of the Texas Family Code, and
not section 6.602 of the Texas Family Code.346
In the broader context, it is not necessary that the court order
the mediation for a mediated settlement agreement to be enforced
pursuant to section 153.0071(e) of the Texas Family Code. It is suf-
ficient that the agreement result from an agreed mediation, which
may occur post-litigation.34 7 In fact, in one case, a mediated settle-
ment agreement containing the language "the agreement is not
subject to revocation" was upheld against an argument that the
party attempting to avoid the agreement was not capable of "mak-
ing an informed, intelligent decision based on her health condition
and medication regime. "348
344. Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (citing
Alvarez v. Reiser, 958 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, writ denied)).
345. Lee v. Lee, No. 10-03-00182-CV, 2004 WL 1794473, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco
Aug. 11, 2004, pet. filed) (not designated for publication); see also In re Lee, No. 10-04-
00286-CV, 2004 WL 2306686, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco Oct. 13, 2004, no pet. h.) (mem. op.)
(finding that the court did not have authority to enjoin a subsequently filed suit to enforce
the mediated settlement agreement).
346. Lee, 2004 WL 1794473, at *1 (citing Kilroy v. Kilroy, 137 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)); In re Circone, 122 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2003, no pet.); In re J.A.W.-N., 94 S.W.3d 119, 120-21 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2002, no pet.).
347. See In re J.A.W.-N., 94 S.W.3d at 121 (stating that the court need not be involved
in the parties' decision to enter into mediation).
348. Domangue v. Domangue, No. 12-04-00029-CV, 2005 WL 1828553, at *1-2 (Tex.
App.-Tyler Aug. 3, 2005, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Section 6.602 of the Texas Family Code
provides that:
A mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if [it] (1) provides, in a
prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or capital letters or under-
lined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation, (2) is signed by each party to the
agreement, and (3) is signed by the party's attorney, if any, who is present at the time
the agreement is signed.
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4. Enforcement in Federal Court
When a mediated settlement agreement is breached before the
entry of judgment in a federal action, the district court will gener-
ally "not exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of
contract counterclaim. '349 In the context of a Title VII dispute, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the withdrawal of a settle-
ment agreement does not change the binding nature of the agree-
ment.350 The appellate court enforced the trial court's decision to
enforce the settlement agreement entered during the pendency of
the action. 1 The court, after noting that the "Louisiana require-
ment that settlement agreements be reduced to writing might ham-
per a significant federal interest" in settling Title VII claims
determined that:
352
Federal law does not require ... that the settlement be reduced to
writing. Absent a factual basis rendering it invalid, an oral agree-
ment to settle a Title VII Claim is enforceable against a plaintiff who
knowingly and voluntarily agrees to the terms of the settlement or
authorized his attorney to settle the dispute. If a party to a Title VII
suit who has previously authorized a settlement changes his mind
when presented with the settlement documents, that party remains
bound by the terms of the agreement. 3
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005). "If [the] mediated settlement
agreement meets [such requirements], a party is entitled to judgment on the agreement
notwithstanding [other rules of law]." Id. § 6.602(c). "[W]hen the [l]egislature enacted
[section 6.602], it definitely and deliberately created a procedural shortcut for enforcement
of mediated settlement agreements in divorce cases." Cayan, 38 S.W.3d at 166.
In [Domangue], the agreement was signed by Peggy, Charles, and their respective
attorneys. Furthermore, the agreement provided that it was "not subject to revoca-
tion." The statement that the agreement was not subject to revocation was promi-
nently displayed beginning at the top half of the fifth page of the document, just above
where the parties and their respective attorneys were to sign. Moreover, the state-
ment was displayed in capital letters, boldfaced type, and underlined. We conclude
that the document meets the requirements of section 6.602.
Domangue, 2005 WL 1828553, at *2.
349. See Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that "[t]he
fact patterns for each cause of action [were] clearly distinct and separable").
350. Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981).
351. Id. at 1210.
352. Id. at 1209.
353. Id.; see also Sanders v. Mary Kay Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:98-CV-1077-D, 1999 WL
20834, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 1999) (exemplifying another Title VII case in which
Fulgence is followed). "An oral agreement is enforceable against a plaintiff who knowingly
and voluntarily agrees to the terms of the settlement." Id. See generally Scott H. Hughes,
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Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,354 held that an employee must knowingly and
voluntarily consent to a settlement agreement under which he
waives his right to pursue a Title VII action. 355 In Allen v. Leal,356
a civil rights action, Judge Hittner indicated that when the medi-
ated settlement agreement is repudiated, a suit on the settlement
contract is the proper avenue for relief.
357
B. Mediated Contracts to Contract or Final Agreements?
1. Intent to Be Bound by Agreement
An agreement to settle is subject to enforcement if it is "com-
plete within itself in every material detail, and ... contains all of
the essential elements of the agreement. ' 358  If the intent to be
bound by the agreement is clear on the face of the memorandum,
the intent to be bound may be determined as a matter of law.359 If
the parties exchange letters agreeing to a settlement but make it
subject to satisfactory legal documentation, the "subject to" lan-
guage will raise a fact issue as to whether the parties' meant the
settlement to be binding.360 Likewise, a settlement memorandum
prepared at the conclusion of a mediation indicating that "the par-
ties' understandings are subject to securing documentation satisfac-
tory to the parties" raises a fact issue on whether the parties
intended to be bound by the agreement. 61
Facilitative Mediation or Evaluative Mediation: May Your Choice Be a Wise One, 59 ALA.
LAW. 246 (1998) (describing the process of mediation).
354. 415 U.S. 36 (1947).
355. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1947).
356. 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
357. Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
358. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995).
359. Cf id. at 461-62 (stating that a court can enforce a settlement agreement that
complies with Rule 11, even if one party no longer consents); cf also Edwards v. Lone Star
Gas Co., 782 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1990) (holding that the interpretation of unambiguous
contracts is a question of law); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394-95 (Tex. 1983) (noting
that under the rules of contract construction, the determination of unambiguous terms and
their effects is a question of law left to the court, but if the terms are ambiguous the court
must look to the true intent of the parties).
360. See Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Dev. Co., 758 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex. 1988) (stating that
the "subject to legal documentation" phrase in an agreement leads to a fact issue to be
submitted to the jury).
361. See Martin v. Black, 909 S.W.2d 192, 197 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995,
writ denied) (identifying that the parties developed two handwritten documents that con-
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On the other hand, in Hardman v. Dault,362 a memorandum of
settlement provided for the dismissal of the action with prejudice
and set a specific amount to be paid at a specific rate, and con-
cluded with the statement: "[f]inal documents to be signed by 1-1-
97. ' ' 363 The agreement was found to be enforceable as a matter of
law, as explained by Justice Green, writing for the court:
There is no "subject to" language in the settlement memorandum
in this case, however. The "final documents" provision neither sug-
gests nor infers that the parties intended that the agreement was to
be subject to any subsequent action by the parties, or that the signing
of documents was to be a condition precedent to the formation of an
enforceable contract. Thus, since the settlement agreement contains
all essential terms, and there being no fact issue concerning whether
the parties intended the settlement agreement to be binding, the par-
tial summary judgment enforcing the written settlement agreement is
affirmed.364
Where the agreement entered at meditation is an enforceable
agreement, it should be considered in interpreting final settlement
papers later drafted, signed, and used to terminate the case.
365 If
multiple documents control the same transaction, they are read to-
gether, even if executed at different times.366
The withdrawal of consent to the entry of an agreed judgment is
ineffective if it occurs after the agreed judgment is entered, at least
where the settlement agreement is not a contract to contract. In
Clayton v. Henry,367 the parties, as the result of a mediated settle-
tain some of the terms of the agreement, which resulted in a fact issue to determine
whether the parties planned to be bound by the agreement).
362. 2 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
363. Hardman v. Dault, 2 S.w.3d 378, 380-81 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
364. Id. at 381.
365. See Hurst v. Am. Racing Equip., Inc., 981 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1998, no pet.) (providing that, because the parties entered into a "Memorandum of
Settlement" that was claimed to be all-inclusive of any additional agreements, the settle-
ment would eliminate subsequent claims).
366. See Mem'l Med. Ctr. of E. Tex. v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. 1997) (con-
cluding that an agreement and release should be read together to glean the intent of the
parties); Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 239 S.W.2d 803, 809
(1951) (identifying that "[wihere several instruments, executed contemporaneously or at
different times, pertain to the same transaction, they will be read together although they do
not expressly refer to each other" (citation omitted)).
367. No. 05-96-01898-CV, 1999 WL 89945 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 24, 1999, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
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ment agreement, had the trial court enter an agreed judgment call-
ing for three payments on stated dates.3 68 The judgment provided
that there would be no execution on the judgment if payments
were timely received.369 When the first payment was not timely
received, "[t]he Claytons filed a motion for new trial asking the
court to withdraw or modify the agreed judgment on the grounds
of failure of consideration, impossibility of performance, ambiguity
in the agreement, or equity. '370 The motion was denied.371 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order, "[b]ecause the
signing of the agreed judgment was not a condition precedent to
the Claytons' performance under the settlement agreement, [and
therefore,] the trial court did not err in refusing to grant them a
new trial. '37
2
2. Contract Incomplete-Terms Missing
In Soliman v. Goltz,373 as a result of mediation, Goltz agreed to
pay money to Soliman, and Soliman agreed to release Goltz, but
the memorandum of the agreement provided for "Goltz to draft
certain documents, including a confidentiality agreement and an
agreement of release. 3 74 After the mediation, the parties could
not agree on the terms of the documents contemplated by the me-
diation memorandum. 375 Soliman then sued Goltz on the media-
tion memorandum, as a contract.376 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's conclusion that the memorandum was an agree-
ment to agree, and not enforceable as a contract. 377
368. Clayton v. Henry, No. 05-96-01898-CV, 1999 WL 89945, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas




372. Id. at *2.
373. No. 05-93-00008-CV, 1993 WL 402740 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 6, 1993, no writ)
(not designated for publication). Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, opinions
that are designated as "unpublished" cannot be cited as authority. TEX. R. App. P. 47.7.
This opinion and the other Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 47.7 cases contained
in this paper are included because of their instructional value-not as precedent.
374. Soliman v. Goltz, No. 05-93-00008-CV, 1993 WL 402740, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las Oct. 6, 1993, no writ) (not designated for publication).
375. Id. at *2.
376. Id.
377. Id. at *8.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the written memorandum, manifest-
ing the terms of the mediation agreement by including, among other
terms, price and time for payment, was not definite enough to consti-
tute a binding contract. There is no enforceable contract where, as
here, the agreement of the parties leaves essential terms-the agree-
ment of release and confidentiality-for later determination and these
terms are never satisfactorily determined. If the nature and extent of
the essential terms are not determined by the preliminary agree-
ment, but are left to be defined and determined by future agreement
of the parties, no binding contract exists.378
A similar holding is found in Castano v. San Felipe Agricultural,
Manufacturing & Irrigation Co.,3 7 9 where Justice Green found:
In the instant case, Castano refers to language regarding "final
documentation;" however, this language simply refers to the time pe-
riod in which San Felipe was obligated to pay Castano the agreed
upon sum as compensation for her mental anguish: "upon execution
of final documentation." The original MSA also references "addi-
tional documents" but only insofar as these documents are necessary
to "implement the provisions and spirit of" the agreement. In fact,
the agreement goes on to say that "notwithstanding such additional
documents the parties confirm that this is a written settlement agree-
ment as contemplated by [s]ection 154.071 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code." The statements referring to "closing" and per-
formance "subject to" further action are also taken out of context.
Unlike Foreca, none of these statements suggests or infers that the
parties intended the agreement to be subject to any subsequent ac-
tion by the parties or that these events were to be conditions prece-
dent to the formation of an enforceable contract. The language,
therefore, fails to raise a fact issue as to whether the parties intended
to be bound under the terms of the MSA.3 8 °
The terms of the Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) were
such that "[a] mediated settlement agreement is enforceable in the
same manner as any other contract."38' "An agreement is enforce-
able if it is 'complete within itself in every material detail, and...
378. Id. (citations omitted).
379. 147 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
380. Castano v. San Felipe Agric., Mfg. & Irrigation Co., 147 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (footnote omitted).
381. Hardman v. Dault, 2 S.w.3d 378, 380 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.)
(citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.071(a) (Vernon 1997)).
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contains all of the essential elements of the agreement.' ,,382 "The
intent of the parties to be bound is an essential element of an en-
forceable contract. ' 383 Although this intent is often a question of
fact, where it "is clear and unambiguous on the face of the agree-
ment, it may be determined as a matter of law. '384 As stated
above, the intent of the parties to be bound is evident from the
wording and context of the MSA. The only question remaining has
to do with the applicable terms of the contract.
Where the settlement agreement is "subject to" action of one
side, and that action is not taken, the other side is released from
performance. 385 This may allow one party to treat a finalized
agreement as repudiated, while suing to enforce under the agree-
ment originally executed.386
Thornton v. Ventura38 7 presents an interesting interpretation of a
mediation form in common use by the mediators of Texas. 88 The
case involved a mediated settlement agreement, which provided
that the defendants would transfer the land in question back to
Ventura for the payment of $1.9 million.389 The agreement also
required that Ventura assume a "note payable to Guaranty Federal
by some or all Defendants and secured by lessee's interest in the
Property on a State Bar of Texas approved form with the following
terms. ' 390 The parties could not agree on a form for the note. "At
the trial before the court, appellants presented two State Bar of
382. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.w.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Cohen v. McCut-
chin, 565 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1978)); Hardman, 2 S.W.3d at 380 (quoting Padilla, 907
S.W.2d at 460).
383. Hardman, 2 S.W.3d at 380.
384. Id.
385. See Hohenburg Bros. Co. v. George E. Gibbons & Co., 537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.
1976) (explaining that one party has no right to immediate performance unless the other
party fulfills the conditions precedent); see also D.E.W., Inc. v. Depco Forms, Inc., 827
S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ) (stating that in Texas, reciprocal
promises "are presumed to be mutually dependent and [a] breach of one will excuse the
performance of the other").
386. See Shaw v. Kennedy, Ltd., 879 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no
writ) (concluding that the appellant was entitled to repudiate the contract because appellee
did not fulfill his end of the agreement).
387. No. 05-95-00113-CV, 1996 WL 132237 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 20, 1996, writ
denied) (not designated for publication).
388. Thornton v. Ventura, No. 05-95-00113-CV, 1996 WL 132237 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Mar. 20, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication).
389. Id. at *1.
390. Id.
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Texas forms" containing indemnity provisions "for a warranty deed
with assumption of a note."'391 The court ruled that indemnity "was
not part of the settlement agreement. '392 The court required the
parties to execute "a warranty deed with [a] note assumption that
did not include an indemnity" agreement.393 The court of appeals
affirmed, finding "that the trial court did not err in concluding that
the indemnity provision was not incorporated by reference into the
settlement agreement. ' 394 "The reference to use of a State Bar of
Texas approved form is not sufficiently specific to incorporate by
reference any particular form. . . . We hold that the settlement
agreement's lack of a specific reference to a particular document
prevents the application of incorporation by reference in this
case.,395
In Montanaro v. Montanaro,396 the appellate court reversed a
trial court's action in setting aside a settlement agreement as a con-
tract to contract.397 The agreement provided for a note, specified
the interest rate and the terms of repayment, and noted that there
had been partial performance.398 The court considered all the ele-
ments surrounding the transaction and held, as a matter of law,
that the agreement was binding and enforceable.399
A final judgment that is founded upon a settlement agreement
reached by the parties must be in strict or literal compliance with
that agreement. In a judgment by consent, "the court has no power
to supply terms, provisions, or essential details not previously agreed
to by the parties." The court can merely approve or reject the agree-
ment .... [and] if the trial court goes beyond the terms of the parties'
agreement, the proper course is to reverse the judgment and remand
the case to the trial court.400
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Thornton, 1996 WL 132237, at *1.
394. Id. at *3.
395. Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
396. 946 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
397. Montanaro v. Montanaro, 946 S.W.2d 428, 430-31 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1997, no writ).
398. Id. at 429, 431.
399. Id. at 431.
400. Buck v. Keats, No. 05-01-00612-CV, 2002 WL 523559, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Apr. 9, 2002, no pet.) (citations omitted) (not designated for publication) (quoting In re
Marriage of Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ)).
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In certain instances, particular specificity is required, as in a me-
diated settlement agreement that purports to constitute a family
settlement agreement of a decedent's estate. In In re Estate of Hal-
bert,40 1 the court invalidated a family settlement agreement. 40 2 To
be enforceable, such agreements must include an agreement not to
probate a will, and an agreement providing for the distribution of
the deceased's property; this agreement did not meet those re-
quirements.4 °3 In Halbert, the court concluded that "[p]erhaps, the
most sound reading of the MSA would be that the parties contem-
plated probating no will, but would instead resolve the dispute by a
future agreement. '40
4
C. Grounds Used to Avoid Mediated Agreements: Duress
Duress was raised as an affirmative defense in an action seeking
specific performance of a mediated settlement agreement in Ran-
dle v. Mid Gulf, Inc. 405 In reversing the trial court's summary judg-
ment for the plaintiff, the court of appeals found a fact issue raised
by Randle's affidavit statements that he was told he could not leave
the mediation until he had settled the case, despite fatigue and
chest pains.40 6 Because the court recognized that "communications
between parties and their attorneys are privileged and not subject
to disclosure[,]" the court found that "confidentiality does not pre-
vent a party from bringing suit for breach of a mediation
agreement. "407
401. No. 06-04-0074-CV, 2005 WL 1981110 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Aug. 18, 2005, no
pet. h.).
402. In re Estate of Halbert, No. 06-04-0074-CV, 2005 WL 1981110 (Tex. App.-Tex-
arkana Aug. 18, 2005, no pet. h.).
403. In re Estate of Morris, 577 S.W.2d 748, 756-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Cook v. Hamer, 158 Tex. 164, 309 S.W.2d 54, 56 (1958) (indicating
that there was an agreement between heirs waiving the provisions of the testatrix's will);
Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (assert-
ing that an agreement to forego probating a will is invalid unless a distribution of property
is included in the agreement).
404. In re Estate of Halbert, 2005 WL 1981110, at *7.
405. No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 8, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication).
406. Id. at *2.
407. Id. at *1 (citations omitted); see also Frazin v. Grunning, No. 05-01-00492-CV,
2002 WL 84457, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 23, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for
publication) (reversing a summary judgment order due to a mediation settlement agree-
ment entered into under extreme duress and distress).
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An agreement that a mediator's report could be submitted to the
trial judge in a suit to terminate parental relations, did not consti-
tute a waiver of the "right under section 154.073(a) that it [the me-
diator's report] 'may not be used as evidence against the
participant in any judicial ... proceeding.' ,
408
A statement 40 9 that a party suffering from fatigue and chest pains
could not leave the mediation until a settlement was reached raises,
at least, a fact question as to duress that is potentially sufficient to
avoid specific enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement.41 °
The court in Randle indicates that duress is "a threat to do some
act which the threatening party has no legal right to do."'411 Ac-
cording to the court, the threat must destroy the free agency of the
threatened party, and cause that party to do something that would
not otherwise be done. 412 "The restraint caused by the threat must
be imminent" and the threatened person must have no means of
protection.413 The Randle court then concludes: "Further, duress
can be pled as an affirmative defense and, if proven, would nullify
an award, contract or obligation.
414
Lype v. Watkins415 was a personal injury case in which the Lypes
filed suit for personal injury damages.416 Ronald Lype and his
daughter, Amy, appeared at the court-ordered "mediation with an
attorney, whom they later discharged. '417 "The mediation resulted
in a handwritten document" purporting to settle all claims.418 Fol-
lowing the mediation, the Lypes refused to sign the release papers
called for in the settlement agreement.419 In defending the action
on the settlement agreement, the Lypes filed affidavits asserting
408. In re T.T., 39 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
409. See Randle, 1996 WL 447954, at *2 (failing to disclose who made the statement).
410. Id.
411. Id. (citing Creative Mfg., Inc. v. Unik, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.c.)).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Randle, 1996 WL 447954, at *2.
415. No. 01-98-00051-CV, 1998 WL 734429 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 22,
1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
416. Lype v. Watkins, No. 01-98-00051-CV, 1998 WL 734429, at *1 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] Oct. 22, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).





that their attorney coerced them into settling the case.120 The trial
court entered summary judgment for the defendants, requiring the
Lypes to execute releases upon receipt of the settlement proceeds,
as called for in the mediated settlement agreement. 421 The court of
appeals affirmed, disposing of their claim of coercion by pointing
out that to be effective as a defense, the coercion must come "from
one who is a party to the contract.
4 22
Duress or undue influence can suffice to set aside a contract, but it is
well-settled that these must emanate from one who is a party to the
contract. Courts will not invalidate contracts on grounds of duress
when the alleged duress derives from a third person who has no in-
volvement with the opposite party to the contract.423
Query: Does this mean that a mediator can never be guilty of coer-
cion or duress? Surely not.4 24
It has been found to be error to enter summary judgment in an
action to enforce a mediated settlement agreement where the op-
ponent has raised a fact issue about the mental capacity of the
party seeking to avoid that agreement.425 That argument did not
426prevail in Domangue v. Domangue, a family law case containingthe statutory language making the agreement nonrevocable.4 7
420. Id.
421. Lype, 1998 WL 734429, at *1.
422. Id. at *3.
423. Id. (citations omitted). Contra Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1099
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("We hold that the court may invoke its inherent power to main-
tain the integrity of the judicial system and its processes by invalidating a court-ordered
mediation settlement agreement obtained through violation and abuse of the judicially-
prescribed mediation procedures.").
424. The problem of coercion, customarily an issue of contract law, is treated as a
matter of "ethical conduct of parties, attorneys, and the mediator himself." Phyllis E. Ber-
nard, Only Nixon Could Go to China: Third Thoughts on the Uniform Mediation Act, 85
MARO. L. REV. 113, 140 (2001).
425. See Lerer v. Lerer, No. 05-99-00474-CV, 2000 WL 567020, at *2 (Tex. App.-
Dallas May 3, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (analyzing mental incapacity
and whether it can bind a party in mediation).
426. No. 12-04-00029-CV, 2005 WL 1828553 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 3, 2005, no pet.
h.) (mem. op.).
427. Domangue v. Domangue, No. 12-04-00029-CV, 2005 WL 1828553, at *2 (Tex.
App.-Tyler Aug 03, 2005, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602
(Vernon Supp. 2005) (containing the statutory language); Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161,
164 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (indicating the appellant argued
"that because section 6.602 is silent regarding enforcement of mediated settlement agree-
2006]
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:325
VI. INCIDENTAL EFFECT OF MEDIATION ORDERS
An order for mediation to take place within 150 days, when also
accompanied by a trial date, does not supersede an existing docket
control order.428 On appeal during mediation, if the mediation fails
the appellate timetable is suspended and may be restarted.429 Fail-
ure to comply with the recommended timetable will result in dis-
missal for want of prosecution, at least after an opportunity to
cure.430 Likewise, the failure to report the status of a case after it is
referred to mediation may be grounds on appeal for dismissal for
want of prosecution after an opportunity to cure is provided.431
VII. TIME TO MEDIATE
That a case is ordered to mediation does not always guarantee
the delay of the case. If the court seeks to proceed while the medi-
ation is ongoing, any error is waived, unless the complaining party
seeks an order staying the proceeding pending the outcome of the
mediation.432 Further, that a case is tentatively settled does not
excuse a party from diligently prosecuting or defending a pending
case. 433 In other words, any tentative settlements should be timely
ments, the agreement in this case must be enforced in the same manner as any other writ-
ten contract").
428. See Feldman v. NationsBank of Tex., N.A., No. 01-94-01018-CV, 1995 WL
389710, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 1995, writ dism'd) (not designated
for publication) (refusing the appellant's argument that the mediation order superseded
the docket control order when the judge wrote the trial date on the mediation order).
429. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Aguilar, No. 08-04-00142-CV, 2004 WL 3017287,
at *1 (Tex. App.-El Paso Dec. 30, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publica-
tion) (noting that the appellate timetable is suspended pending the mediation, and that
after the failure of the mediation, the timetable is restarted); Boone v. Burr, 115 S.W.3d
802, 802 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (holding that the appellate timeta-
ble was suspended during mediation).
430. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Aguilar, No. 08-04-00142-CV, 2004 WL 3017287, at *1
(Tex. App.-El Paso Dec. 30, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication).
431. Peiskee v. City of Hearne, No. 10-02-00218-CV, 2004 WL 2363787, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Waco Oct. 20, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication).
432. See Phoenix Bit & Tool, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (declaring that summary judgment was proper
when the appellant waived his argument by not presenting it at trial and by not seeking to
stay the summary judgment proceedings until the final outcome of mediation).
433. See Fed. Lanes, Inc. v. City of Houston, 905 S.W.2d 686, 689-90 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (describing a case where the trial court refused to
reinstate upon an unverified joint motion of the parties, but the court of appeals reversed
and remanded).
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implemented or repudiated. Parties who repudiate settlement
agreements are particularly at risk. The plaintiff in Ellmossallamy
v. Huntsman434 was successful in obtaining reinstatement of a case
dismissed for want of prosecution after he demonstrated that his
failure to pursue the case was not due to conscious indifference or
any intentional acts of the party, but was due to mistake or misun-
derstanding. 435 Emphasizing the trial court's discretion, the court
in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Kendrick436 affirmed a trial
court's refusal to reinstate an action dismissed for want of prosecu-
tion.437 There, the FDIC's delay in deciding whether to accept a
settlement offer was fatal.438 It should be remembered that neither
settlement activity nor the passivity of the opponent excuses a want
of diligence.439 In Pickell v. Guaranty National Life Insurance
Co.,44° a mediated settlement agreement was not enough to relieve
a defendant of the need to appear at trial and did not preclude a
post-answer default.441 The agreement should be brought to the
court's attention by amended pleadings or motion for summary
judgment.
While mediation is a flexible process, and can usually be ar-
ranged quickly and with little notice, there are limits on the timing
of a court-ordered mediation. A party must be allowed ten days
after receipt of notice of the mediation order to object to the refer-
434. 830 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
435. See Ellmossallamy v. Huntsman, 830 S.W.2d 299, 301-02 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (recognizing that appellant's apparent failure to prosecute with
due diligence was not intentional).
436. 897 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
437. See FDIC v. Kendrick, 897 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ)
(holding that the trial judge was within his discretion in refusing to reinstate the action).
438. Id.
439. Tex. Soc., Daughters of Am. Revolution v. Estate of Hubbard, 768 S.W.2d 858,
862 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
440. 917 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
441. See Pickell v. Guar. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 917 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (upholding a default judgment against appellant even though
the judge was aware of a mediated settlement agreement prior to issuing the default
judgment).
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ral to mediation.442 Furthermore, mediation should not be ordered
during a period of statutory abatement.443
VIII. EFFECT OF MEDIATED AGREEMENT ON PENDING ACTION
It should not be forgotten that where there is a settlement agree-
ment by the parties and the consent to that settlement is not with-
drawn, the court may enter judgment on the agreement. If a
settlement is reached while a case is on appeal, the cause becomes
moot.444 "When a cause becomes moot while on appeal, all previ-
ous orders and judgments should be set aside and the cause, not
merely the appeal, dismissed.
'445
Some courts of appeals, however, do accede to the parties' re-
quests to reverse and remand to the trial court for entry of an order
of dismissal,446 or to reverse and remand for entry of an agreed
442. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.022(b) (Vernon 2005); see also Keene
Corp. v. Gardner, 837 S.W.2d 224, 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (stating that
an order for sanctions for failure to participate in a mediation ordered with less than ten
days notice was erroneous).
443. Permanente Med. Ass'n of Tex. v. Johnson, 917 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1996, no writ).
444. Johnson v. Gest, No. 03-96-00352-CV, 1996 WL 627387, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin
Oct. 30, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication); Panterra Corp. v. Am. Dairy
Queen, 908 S.W.2d 300, 300 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
445. See Panterra, 908 S.W.2d at 300 (quoting Freeman v. Burrows, 141 Tex. 318, 171
S.W.2d 863, 863 (1943)); see also Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency,
847 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. 1993) (holding that petitioner's cause was rendered moot on
appeal when respondent withdrew from the services that petitioner sought injunctive relief
against); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hughes, 827 S.W.2d 859, 859 (Tex.
1992) (per curiam) (holding that when the parties settled by joint motion to dismiss, the
appeal was mooted); Freeman v. Burrows, 141 Tex. 318, 171 S.W.2d 863, 863 (1943) (stating
that "when a cause becomes moot on appeal, all previous orders and judgments should be
set aside ... and the cause. . . dismissed"); Kennedy v. Artyn, Inc., No. 14-00-000376-CV,
2000 WL 1472432, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 5, 2000, no pet.) (not desig-
nated for publication) (granting a motion to dismiss the appeal after successful settlement
was reached through mediation); Toothman v. Bexar County Hosp. Dist., No. 04-96-00591-
CV, 1997 WL 13645, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 15, 1997, no writ) (not designated
for publication) (holding that after the parties successfully mediated the dispute, the ap-
peal was moot).
446. See Comprehensive Investigations & Sec. v. Perry, No. 14-98-00427-CV, 1999
WL 649118, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 1999, no pet.) (not designated
for publication) (granting a joint motion to reverse and remand the cause to the trial court
to dismiss the cause in order to effectuate the settlement agreement); Alloju v. Townewest
Homeowners Ass'n, No. 01-96-0394-CV, 1996 WL 434185, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 1, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication) (reversing the judgment and
remanding the cause to the trial court to dismiss the cause after the parties filed a joint
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judgment,447 or for proceedings "not inconsistent with this opin-
ion." '448 The conflict between dismissal and remand is fully illus-
trated by the majority and dissenting opinions in Panterra Corp. v.
American Dairy Queen.449
Another decision, Hudson v. Small a involved a case on appeal
where the court ordered the case to mediation.451 Subsequently,
the mediator reported that the case had settled before the media-
tion.452 The parties were queried on whether the case had settled,
and if not, were asked to inform the court of the status of the ap-
peal, including the status of the reporter's record.453 Upon receiv-
ing no response, the court of appeals dismissed the case.454 Also
note that an agreement to mediate, before submitting a case to ar-
bitration, does not waive a party's right to arbitration.455
IX. CONFIDENTIALITY OF MEDIATION
In addition to Rule 408 of the Texas Rules of Evidence,456 pro-
tecting settlement discussions,457 there are several provisions in the
motion requesting such action); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Apache Corp., No. 01-96-0173-
CV, 1996 WL 404033, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 18, 1996, no writ) (not
designated for publication) (granting a joint motion to vacate the trial court's judgment
and remand because of settlement).
447. State v. Stone, No. 01-96-01020-CV, 1996 WL 680114, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] Nov. 21, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication).
448. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 1996 WL 404033, at *1.
449. 908 S.W.2d 300, 300 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (holding that be-
cause the court cannot affirm the judgment of the lower court and dismiss the appeal, all
previous orders and judgments are set aside and the cause dismissed). Justice Duncan
argues in her dissent that a final judgment should be entered so as to preserve the appel-
lee's potential res judicata defense. Id. at 303 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
450. No. 05-98-00081-CV, 1998 WL 462539 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 11, 1998, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
451. Hudson v. Small, No. 05-98-00081-CV, 1998 WL 462539, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las Aug. 11, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (reiterating the court's insis-




455. Tex. Residential Mortgage, L.P. v. Portman, 152 S.W.3d 861, 863 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2005, no pet.).
456. TEX. R. EVID. 408.
457. See generally Wayne Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotia-
tions, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (1988) (discussing how evidentiary rules may protect the confi-
dentiality of settlement discussions); Jon R. Waltz & J. Patrick Huston, The Rules of
Evidence in Settlement, 5 LITn. 11 (1978) (illustrating the effects of evidentiary rules on
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Texas ADR Act that require mediation proceedings to be confi-
dential, beginning with section 154.053(b), which relates to stan-
dards and duties of impartial third parties. 5 8 This provision
requires that the mediator keep confidential any information given
up in confidence during mediation, unless expressly authorized by
the disclosing party.459 Section 154.053(c) is even broader, requir-
ing that "[u]nless the parties agree otherwise, all matters, including
the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their counsel during
the settlement process, are confidential and may never be disclosed
to anyone, including the appointing court.
460
Section 154.073 is subject to two exceptions that provide safe-
guards of confidentiality regarding communications and recordings
during mediation proceedings and grant broader statutory protec-
tion than those discussed above.461 From a plain reading of the
statute, section 154.073 is much broader than section 154.053, and
settlement negotiations); Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Evidence Involving Compromise
or Offer of Compromise As Inadmissible Under Rule 408 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 72
A.L.R. FED. 592 (1985) (describing Rule 408's impact on settlement offers and
discussions).
458. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053(b) (Vernon 2005).
459. Id.
460. Id. § 154.053(c).
461. Id. § 154.073. This section states:
(a) Except as provided by [s]ubsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), a communication relating
to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alter-
native dispute resolution procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal
judicial proceedings, is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used
as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
(b) Any record made at an alternative dispute resolution procedure is confidential,
and the participants or the third party facilitating the procedure may not be required
to testify in any proceedings relating to or arising out of the matter in dispute or be
subject to process requiring disclosure of confidential information or data relating to
or arising out of the matter in dispute.
(c) An oral communication or written material used in or made part of an alternative
dispute resolution procedure is admissible or discoverable if it is admissible or discov-
erable independent of the procedure.
(e) If this section conflicts with other legal requirements for disclosure of communica-
tions, records, or materials, the issue of confidentiality may be presented to the court
having jurisdiction of the proceedings to determine, in camera, whether the facts, cir-
cumstances, and context of the communications or materials sought to be disclosed
warrant a protective order of the court or whether the communications or materials
are subject to disclosure.
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appears to apply to the neutral third-party mediator. 62 While sec-
tion 154.053 appears to be waivable by the parties, the right to pro-
tect the confidentiality of the process belongs to the mediator. The
right vested in the mediator by section 154.073 should not be waiv-
able by the parties without wrongdoing by the mediator.
It is surprising that there have been so few decisions relating to
the issue of confidentiality in the years following the passage of the
Texas ADR Act. Many commentators have discussed, generally,
the scope of the confidentiality provisions and the potential ques-
tions raised by these provisions during mediation proceedings.
463
Mediation participants in Texas, whether in court-ordered or con-
sensual mediations,464 expect what is said and done in the media-
tion to be kept confidential, just as a penitent expects a clergyman
462. See JEROME S. LEVY & ROBERT C. PRATHER, SR., TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE:
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 11:12-15 (describing a mediator's role as it per-
tains to confidential information). According to the guide, "the statute ([s]ection
154.073(b)) provides that the mediator may not be compelled to testify as to anything that
was stated at the mediation by any of the participants." Id. § 11:12. Moreover, "it would
appear that the confidentiality privilege belongs to the mediator and, as such, even if the
parties agree to waive confidentiality, the mediator cannot be compelled to discuss what
transpired." Id. § 11:14.
463. See generally Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Con-
tract Law Collides with Confidentiality, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33 (2001) (discussing loss of
confidentiality when disputes concerning settlement agreements reached during mediation
arise); Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish
Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 79-85 (2001) (discussing the
need for uniform mediation rules regarding confidentiality); Lawrence R. Freedman &
Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 37 (1986) (discussing the confidentiality requirement); Kevin Gibson, Confi-
dentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. DisP. RESOL. 25 (1992) (discussing
confidentiality broadly and then analyzing it from a moral perspective); Eric D. Green, A
Heretical View of a Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1986) (discussing
the confidentiality requirement); Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No
Evil: The Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Confi-
dentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715
(1997) (discussing the problems associated with ADR confidentiality); Philip J. Ritter,
ADR: What About Confidentiality?, 51 TEX. B.J. 26 (1988) (analyzing confidentiality in
ADR); Edward F. Sherman, Confidentiality in ADR Proceedings: Policy Issues Arising
from the Texas Experience, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 541 (1997) (describing the confidentiality
requirement); Gary Joseph Kirkpatrick, Should Mediators Have a Confidentiality Privi-
lege?, MEDIATION Q., Sept. 1985, at 85 (commenting on ADR confidentiality).
464. See In re Cartwright, 104 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
no pet.) (indicating that the confidentiality provisions apply to both consensual and court-
ordered mediations).
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to keep any communication confidential.465 As one commentator,
Brian D. Shannon, wrote: "One of the cornerstones of the enact-
ment was the statute's broad confidentiality protection.... Hence,
taken together these various provisions place limits on future testi-
mony in later adjudications and require confidentiality outside of
other legal proceedings.
4 66
Despite the clarity of the Texas ADR Act, the general agree-
ment that confidentiality is at the heart of the mediation process,
and the acceptance of confidentiality by Texas mediators and attor-
neys, the issues concerning confidentiality have not been clearly
defined or properly addressed by the judiciary.
The first case on confidentiality under the Texas ADR Act, Wil-
liams v. State,467 was a criminal case which properly held that a
court could not consider any evidence from a dispute resolution
procedure, even in a criminal case. 46 8 However, the court required
that a party complaining of the disclosure of confidential informa-
tion obtained during a mediation must, to obtain relief on appeal,
specify what results of the mediation (other than that the case set-
tled) were reported to the trial court, "the manner in which the
results were reported, or how the results were allegedly considered
by the trial court.
469
465. See TEX. R. EVID. 505 (establishing a privilege between penitent and priest that
may only be dismissed by consent). As with the clergy-penitent privilege, the mediation
statute recognizes no exceptions to the privilege, except by consent of the parties, unless it
be found in the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, section 154.073(d). Thus, the
holding in Nicholson v. Wittig, 832 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
orig. proceeding), is relevant to the interpretation of the statutes in question:
In fact, no exceptions to the privilege are set forth in [R]ule 505 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Evidence. Rule 505 bears no relationship to the attorney-client, Tex. R. Civ.
Evid. 503, physician-patient, Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 509, or mental health professional-
patient, Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 510, privileges, all of which set forth specific exceptions. In
particular, the attorney-client privilege, Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 503, focuses, as does the
dissenting opinion, on the nature of the communication. Rule 505 makes no reference
to the content of the communication; rather, the rule focuses on the counseling oppor-
tunity. The rule is intended to shroud a confidence of a communicant in the privilege.
Id.
466. Brian D. Shannon, Dancing with the One That "Brung Us"-Why the Texas ADR
Community Has Declined to Embrace the UMA, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 197, 201-03 (2003).
467. 770 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.).
468. Williams v. State, 770 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1989, no
pet.).
469. Parmer v. Pre-Fab Constr., Inc., No. 14-95-00752-CV, 1997 WL 7020, at *5 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication).
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The first major decision concerning confidentiality protections
for mediation in Texas occurred in federal court.470 Applying
Texas law, the court in Smith v. Smith47' stated that "comity and
the expectations of the [m]ediator and the parties at the time the
mediation was conducted required [that it] give due deference to
the Texas law and rules. 47 2 The court refused to compel the medi-
ator to testify on the issue of whether the defendants, in the media-
tion, defrauded the plaintiff into signing the mediated settlement
agreement.473 This decision gives a full discussion of the Texas stat-
ute, but draws few conclusions.
Until recently, the other Texas decisions have provided little illu-
mination on the meaning of the statute. For example, in J.B.J. Dis-
tributors, Inc. v. Jaikaran,474 the court noted:
The referral order directed that the Moderated Settlement Confer-
ence was to be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and
that all matters, including the conduct and demeanor of the parties
and their counsel, would remain confidential and would not be dis-
closed to anyone, including the court. We conclude that the settle-
ment conference was duly conducted pursuant to the provisions of
the section.475
The first negative decision on confidentiality arising in Texas
came in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec. 17, 1996.476 Con-
sidering the Texas ADR Act inapplicable to the case, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in what some commentators consider to be
a poorly reasoned opinion, 477 held that 7 U.S.C. § 5101(c)(3)(D),
470. See Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 669 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (implying that the confi-
dentiality of the mediation could be breached where there is fraud).
471. 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
472. Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
473. Id. at 674-75.
474. 744 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
475. J.B.J. Distrib., Inc. v. Jaikaran, 744 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, no writ) (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.051 (Vernon
1986)).
476. 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998).
477. See Charles Pou, Jr., Gandhi Meets Elliot Ness: 5th Circuit Ruling Raises Con-
cerns About Confidentiality in Federal Agency ADR, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring
1999, at 5 (criticizing the Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec.
17, 1996, 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also Joshua J. Engelbart, Federal Mediation
Privilege: Should Mediation Communications Be Protected From Subsequent Civil and
Criminal Proceedings?, 1999 J. DisP. RESOL. 73, 82 (1999) (grappling with the problems of
recognizing a federal mediator's privilege through case analysis).
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requiring "a state agricultural loan mediation program to provide
that mediation sessions shall be confidential in order to qualify for
federal funding, '4 78 did not create "an evidentiary privilege that
protects information relating to mediation sessions from disclosure
in grand jury proceedings... [but rather it] requires only that me-
diation sessions remain 'confidential.' 'Confidential' does not nec-
essarily mean 'privileged.' ,,479 The court observed that because the
release of information was to the grand jury, the information would
not be severely compromised unless an indictment was returned.48 °
In Allen v. Leal, a federal civil rights action, the plaintiff repudi-
ated the settlement agreement, alleging that the mediator had
forced the settlement.48' The trial court released the parties, and
the mediator, from the confidentiality requirements of Rule 201 of
the Local Rules for the Southern District of Texas.482 In releasing
the mediator from the rules of confidentiality, Judge Hittner noted:
The [c]ourt fully recognizes the importance and gravity of the rules
of confidentiality governing mediation. However, because the plain-
tiffs, in this particular situation, actually "opened the door" by at-
tacking the professionalism and integrity of the mediator and the
mediation process, the [c]ourt was compelled, in the interest of jus-
tice, to breach the veil of confidentiality.4 83
In Zidell v. Zidell,484 the appellate court upheld the trial court's
exclusion of evidence concerning statements made in the course of
mediation, where no agreement was reached.485
[T]he confidentiality provision works as it was designed-to protect
communications made during mediation that do not result in a bind-
478. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec. 17, 1996, 148 F.3d 487, 491 (5th Cir.
1998).
479. Id. at 492.
480. Id. at 493. This case, and other cases grappling with the problems of recognizing
a federal mediator's privilege, are discussed in Joshua J. Engelhart, Federal Mediation Priv-
ilege: Should Mediation Communications Be Protected from Subsequent Civil & Criminal
Proceedings, 1999 J. DisP. RESOL. 73, 77 (1999). See also ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE
TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 2001 app. e (2001).
481. Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
482. Id. at 947.
483. Id. at 947 n.4.
484. No. 05-96-00052-CV, 1997 WL 424429 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 30, 1997, no writ)
(not designated for publication).
485. Zidell v. Zidell, No. 05-96-00052-CV, 1997 WL 424429, at *9 (Tex. App.-Dallas
July 30, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication).
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ing and final settlement of all or part of a lawsuit. Based on this
record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it applied section 154.073 to exclude communications made
during mediation.486
Similarly, the Austin Court of Appeals in Texas Parks & Wildlife
Department v. Davis held that "section 154.073 requires that com-
munications and records made in an ADR procedure remain confi-
dential; consequently, the manner in which the participants
negotiate should not be disclosed to the trial court.
487
A majority of the Beaumont Court of Appeals in In re Daley,
however, rejected the argument that this holding meant that "all
communications, conversations, and records made in an ADR pro-
ceeding remain confidential.
4s8
Rather than a blanket confidentiality rule for participants, the stat-
ute renders confidential "a communication relating to the subject
matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an
ADR procedure." We do not find the questions-whether Daley at-
tended the mediation and whether he had the mediator's permission
to leave when he did-concern the subject matter of the underlying
suit or the manner in which the participants negotiated.48 9
The court concluded that the question of whether Daley, the in-
surance company's representative, had left the mediation before it
ended, concerned "only the procedural issue of attendance, not the
subject matter of the dispute being mediated. Therefore, we hold
the trial court's order [allowing Daley to be deposed on whether
and when he left the mediation] is not in violation of the Alternate
Dispute Resolution statute.
490
The Dallas Court of Appeals, in Avary v. Bank of America, N.
A., 491 dealt with another facet of the confidentiality of mediations:
486. Id.
487. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. App.-Austin
1999, no pet.).
488. In re Daley, 29 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding).
489. Id. (emphasis added).
490. Id.; see also Phyllis E. Bernard, Only Nixon Could Go to China: Third Thoughts
on the Uniform Mediation Act, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 113, 124 n.33 (2001) (stating that the
court in Daley held "where the trial court had ordered parties to attend mediation, the
mediator could be examined on the limited question of whether the mediator had given
permission for the party to leave"). This statement appears to be in error in that no effort
was made in the Daley case to depose the mediator. See In re Daley, 29 S.W.3d at 915-18.
491. 72 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied).
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whether it protects mediation communications when they form the
basis of a separate and unique action?4 92 There, in the process of
negotiating the settlement of a personal injury case, Bank of
America (the Bank), as representative of two estates, purportedly
made a decision during mediation, with regard to a settlement pro-
posal, without considering the estates' tax liability.493 After the suit
that was the subject of the mediation was settled, Avary, as guard-
ian of the minors whose estates were represented by the Bank,
sued the Bank for breach of a fiduciary duty, claiming that the "re-
jection of the $450,000 offer and the acceptance of a smaller alloca-
tion was a breach of [fiduciary duty]. 494 The trial court refused to
allow Avary to conduct discovery to establish the breach of fiduci-
ary duty claim on the basis that all communications that occurred
during the mediation were confidential or privileged under section
154.073 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.495 Having
precluded the development of Avary's case, the trial court then en-
tered a "no evidence" summary judgment for the Bank.496 The
court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding the Bank was a
fiduciary, and as such, had a duty of full disclosure to the benefici-
ary. 497 That duty of disclosure, which formed the basis of this new
lawsuit, allowed the trial court to conclude under section
154.073(e) that in light of the conflict of the "facts, circumstances,
and context," disclosure was warranted.498
Specifically, the Dallas court held:
We are not presented with the question whether discovery of media-
tion communications would be appropriate if sought in the same case
in which mediation had failed, and in which the parties were pro-
ceeding to trial on their original claims and defenses. Nor are we
presented with the questions whether a mediator can be compelled
to testify or respond to discovery. We conclude only that where a
claim is based upon a new and independent tort committed in the
course of the mediation proceedings, and that tort encompasses a
duty to disclose, section 154.073 does not bar discovery of the claim
492. Avary v. Bank of Am., N.A., 72 S.W.3d 779, 803 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet.
denied).
493. Id. at 785.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 786.
496. Id.
497. Avary, 72 S.W.3d at 803.
498. Id. at 803.
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where the trial judge finds in light of the 'facts, circumstances, and
context,' disclosure is warranted.499
Upon remand, the trial court did order disclosure. The court of
appeals denied the subsequent request for a protective writ of
mandamus. The party seeking to protect the information from dis-
closure sought a writ of mandamus, but settled the case while that
petition was pending.5° This simplistic decision by the Dallas
court, made without extensive examination of the subject, repre-
sents a complete lack of understanding of the importance of confi-
dentiality in the mediation process, to the mediator, and to the
parties. That the disclosure is to occur in a subsequent proceeding,
nonetheless, chills the process, and places a formidable obstacle in
the path of successful mediations.
In Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchange, °a the Austin Court of Ap-
peals refused to allow an insurer to put on evidence that, during a
mediation, it had made an offer to settle in good faith. ° The trial
court's exclusion of the evidence was affirmed, and Avary was dis-
tinguished because it concerned a bank's breach of fiduciary duty
in rejecting a higher settlement offer during mediation. The Avary
court allowed evidence of the bank's conduct during mediation be-
cause it went to the heart of the parties' dispute.5"3 In Allison,
however, the district court excluded this evidence primarily be-
cause Fire Insurance Exchange's conduct was at issue.5 °4
499. Id. at 802-03; see also Rebecca H. Hiers, Navigating Mediation's Uncharted Water,
57 RUTGERS L. REV. 531, 575 (2005) (concluding that courts are willing to create excep-
tions to the confidentiality requirement in meditations when the alleged misconduct results
in an unfair agreement); Peter Robinson, Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be All
Wrong: Why the UMA's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceed-
ings Should Be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 135, 154 n.147 (stating,
"whether a duty of disclosure exists, nondisclosure (as opposed to affirmative misrepresen-
tation) can be treated as grounds to invalidate a contract. Therefore, misrepresentation or
concealment may be grounds to invalidate a contract.").
500. See Brief for Ass'n of Attorney Mediators As Amici Curiae Supporting of Peti-
tion for Writ of Mandamus, In re Bank of Am., N.A., No. 04-0544, 2004 WL 1811113, at *1,
*16 (Tex. July 27, 2004).
501. 98 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. granted) (noting that this judgment
was vacated and remanded by agreement on Mar. 26, 2004).
502. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 259 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet.
granted).
503. Avary, 72 S.W.3d at 796.
504. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 260.
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The Allison court also declined to admit evidence from the medi-
ation.50 5 The court took this approach because, in similar cases
where the entire basis of the claim was the amount of the insurance
company's settlement offer, it was necessary for the court to admit
settlement negotiation evidence. 06 These "similar cases" did not
involve mediated settlement negotiations. The Austin Court of
Appeals in Allison reasoned that:
Here, although the district court could have admitted evidence of
Ballard's demands at mediation for the purpose of countering her
contention that [Fire Insurance Exchange] unduly delayed in paying
her claims, he excluded the evidence because of the danger of unfair
prejudice and because of the general rule that settlement discussions
are confidential. In light of the standard of review, we decline to
breach the "cloak of confidentiality" that exists to encourage settle-
ment discussions. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not
act in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or without regard for any
guiding rules or principles in excluding evidence of settlement offers
made during mediation.
50 7
In the context of a divorce mediation, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals in Boyd v. Boyd 08 held that "[w]here a person is under a
duty to disclose material information, refrains from doing so, and
thereby leads another to contract in reliance on a mistaken under-
standing of the facts, the resulting contract is subject to rescission
due to the intentional nondisclosure. ' 50 9 For this reason, the court
concluded that the mediated settlement agreement was unenforce-
able, even though it complied with section 6.602(b) of the Texas
Family Code.510
505. Id. (basing its decision on U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding), and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding)).
506. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (stating that evidence of settlement agreements is inadmissi-
ble under the rules of evidence); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d
260, 261 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (finding that evidence of
settlement offers are excluded because "such evidence does not represent a party's actual
position, but is an amount he is willing to give or take to avoid the expense or annoyance
of litigation" (quoting Krenek v. S. Tex. Elec. Coop. Inc., 502 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ))).
507. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 260.
508. 67 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
509. Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
510. Id. at 403.
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In In re Acceptance Insurance Co., the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals addressed a specific request for disclosure of mediation com-
munications and found those materials to be confidential. 511
Clearly, "the manner in which participants negotiate should not be
disclosed to the trial court.
'512
In In re Learjet Inc.,51 3 videotapes, not made to facilitate the ren-
dition of legal service but to present factual information to the op-
posing parties in a mediation proceeding, were found not to be
protected by section 154.073(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.514  Rather, the court relied upon section
154.073(c), which states that "material used in or made a part of an
alternative dispute resolution procedure is admissible or discovera-
ble if it is admissible or discoverable independent of the proce-
dure. ' 51 5 In addition, the court found that the videotapes were
neither protected by the attorney-client privilege, nor the nontesti-
fying expert privilege, and thus were discoverable. 51 6 This holding
finds support in Rule 192.3(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which allows for the discovery of photographs and video-
tapes, whereas, had the subject of the disclosure been a written
document, the result should have been very different. 517
The dangerous significance of the Avary decision became evi-
dent when it was cited as authority in Alford v. Bryant5 8 for the
proposition that a mediator may be called to testify to disclosures
allegedly made (or not made) by an attorney during mediation.51 9
511. In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 452 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig.
proceeding).
512. Id. In this situation the court prohibited questions about an insurance adjuster's
conduct during a mediation, and in particular, whether the adjuster used a cell phone dur-
ing the negotiation. Id. at 453.
513. 59 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
514. In re Learjet Inc., 59 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceed-
ing [mand. denied]).
515. TEx CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(c) (Vernon 2002).
516. In re Learjet, 59 S.W.3d at 846.
517. See Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the statu-
tory privilege for written communications pertaining to a mediation proceeding were not
subject to a "good cause" exception).
518. 137 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
519. Alford v. Bryant, 137 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). One
student commentator has said of this decision: "[r]ecently, a Texas state court added to the
confusion surrounding its mediation confidentiality protection by creating a judicial excep-
tion in a legal malpractice case." Joshua S. Rogers, Comment, Riner v. Newbraugh: The
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Alford involved an action for attorney malpractice, purportedly
committed during the course of mediation.52' At trial, the court
refused to allow the mediator to testify. The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded, holding that the mediation privilege
could not be used offensively.521 Thus the district court erred by
ordering the mediator to testify.
522
The district court failed to consider that the mediator had not
made use of the information and failed to recognize the mediator's
own privilege not to testify.523 The Alford decision clearly contra-
venes the plain wording of the broad "iron clad" Texas statute and
would not be admissible even under the UMA, which does recog-
nize some exceptions to confidentiality in mediations. Under the
UMA, subsection 4(b), both the mediation party (4(b)(1)) and the
mediator (4(b)(2)) "may refuse to disclose.., a mediation commu-
nication. '5 24 Section 6(a) of the UMA provides an exception to the
privilege: "There is no privilege ... except as otherwise provided in
subsection (c) ... for a mediation communication that is offered to
prove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malprac-
tice filed against a mediation party, nonparty participant, or repre-
Role of Mediator Testimony in the Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreement, 107 W.
VA. L. REV. 329, 345 (2004).
520. Alford, 137 S.W.3d at 918.
521. Id. at 922.
522. See id. at 919 (basing the refusal on one of the confidentiality provisions in the
alternative dispute resolution proceedings for Texas).
523. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Eviden-
tiary Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come Into Conflict with the Modern Humanistic The-
ories?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 241, 257-61 (2002) (discussing the complexity of issues arising
concerning privileges that were not considered by the courts in Alford and Avary); Edward
Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary
Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 317-37 (2003) (examining weaknesses in Wigmore's instru-
mental theory as well as the use of the other potential bases such as the right to informa-
tional privacy and the general right of privacy); Edward Imwinkelried, The Rivalry
Between Truth and Privilege: The Weaknesses of the Supreme Court's Instrumental Reason-
ing in Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 49 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 974-82 (1998) (question-
ing the accuracy and use of empirical data by the Supreme Court in establishing a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege); Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justification of
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1493-98 (1985) (considering the appli-
cation of the power theory, which states that privilege law does not protect the privacy of
all, merely the elite); Eileen A. Scallen, Relational and Informational Privileges and the
Case of the Mysterious Mediation Privilege, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 537 (2004) (discussing
the use of privilege in mediation and how the justifications for privileges differ based on
whether designed to enhance specific relationships or protect certain information).
524. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 4 (2002).
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sentative of a party based on conduct occurring during a
mediation. 5 25 However, subsection (c) directly contradicts Alford
by stating that "[a] mediator may not be compelled to provide evi-
dence of a mediation conference referred to in subsection (a)(6) or
(b)(2). ''1526
A. The Out-of-State Authorities
The California Supreme Court has adopted the position that the
mediation process is confidential, and that the courts may not in-
vade that confidentiality. 27 In Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v.
Bramalea California, Inc.,528 the court held that "[t]o carry out the
purpose of encouraging mediation by ensuring confidentiality, the
statutory scheme, which includes sections 703.5, 1119, and 1121,
unqualifiedly bars disclosure of communications made during me-
diation absent an express statutory exception.
529
In a subsequent decision, Rojas v. Superior Court,53 ° the Califor-
nia Supreme Court additionally held that documents, prepared
only for presentation in mediation, were protected under the Cali-
fornia statutes. 531  In Nielsen-Allen v. Industrial Maintenance
Corp.,532 the court, citing Foxgate, stated: "A majority of jurisdic-
tions recognize and enforce such a privilege .... [There are] no
exceptions to the confidentiality of mediation communications....
525. Id. § 6.
526. Id.
527. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal.
2001).
528. 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
529. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal.
2001). A number of cases in agreement with Foxgate have been decided. See Nat'l Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Price, 78 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that "[t]aken to-
gether, these sections express the legislature's intent to create a blanket prohibition against
disclosing mediation communication, whether or not the communication concerns a settle-
ment, unless the parties consent or an exception applies"); see also In re Anonymous, 283
F.3d 627, 634 (4th Cir. 2002) (federal mediation privilege did not violate due process rights,
therefore, permission was denied to allow a mediator to testify); Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk.
Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (recognizing federal mediation privi-
lege); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (recognizing a federal mediation privilege); In re RDM Sports Group,
Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (recognizing a federal mediation privilege).
530. 93 P.3d 260 (Cal. 2004).
531. Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (Cal. 2004).
532. No. Civ. 2001/70 FR, 2004 WL 502567 (D. V.I. Jan. 28, 2004).
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Neither a mediator nor a party may reveal communications made
during mediation.
533
In Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc.,534 the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals faced a situation similar to the one in Avary 35 There, in a
prior union negotiation, statements had been made by the union
negotiator that "'flagrantly misrepresented' the detectives' inter-
ests and 'continuously rejected' offers from the county regarding
the parity issue. "536 The plaintiffs, members of the union, sought
relief in a subsequent action for the union's breach of the duty of
fair representation.537 The plaintiffs sought to call the mediator to
testify to the misrepresentations.538 The trial court, in quashing the
subpoena for the mediator, observed that "the proffered reasons
for [the mediator's] testimony are insufficient to overcome the
compelling need for a mediator to maintain the confidences of the
parties and the appearance of impartiality.
'539
The appellate court affirmed and adopted the language of the
trial judge based on the subsequently adopted Minnesota media-
tion confidentiality statute, which appears to presage the approach
adopted by the Texas Legislature that "[a] person cannot be ex-
amined as to any communication or document, including
worknotes, made or used in the course of or because of mediation
pursuant to an agreement to mediate. '540 At a minimum, the
courts must recognize that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, subsections 154.053(b) and (c), and subsection 154.073(a),
create a separate confidential right in the mediator (as opposed to
the parties) that precludes the testimony of the mediator.5 41 The
statutes could not be any more plain.
533. Nielsen-Allen v. Indus. Maint. Corp., No. Civ.2001/70 FR, 2004 WL 502567, at *1
(D. V.I. Jan. 28, 2004) (citation omitted).
534. 372 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
535. Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
536. Id. at 6.
537. Id. at 3.
538. Id. at 2.
539. Id. at 6.
540. Sonenstahl, 372 N.W.2d at 6.





Because this Article is intended to be a collection of decided
cases, it is beyond its purview to resolve the issue of confidentiality.
The author is convinced that the decision in Alford, and its prede-
cessor Avary, require an early resolution of the scope of confidenti-
ality in Texas mediations. The issue of confidentiality should not
be hard to decide in Texas. The question seems to be whether the
Texas ADR Act provides blanket confidentiality to all participants,
as found by the California court in Rojas,5 42 and to all statements
made in the mediation or documents not otherwise discoverable
but prepared for use in the mediation. If it is found that the Act
provides blanket confidentiality, there would still be statutory ex-
ceptions, for example, reporting child abuse. Additionally, there
would be waivers of protection; for example, waiver because of
wrongdoing by the mediator (coercion) as to parties. There would
also be waiver as to the parties' confidentiality if, for example, one
party repudiates the mediated settlement agreement and another
party seeks to enforce that agreement.
C. Solution One: Blanket Confidentiality
It seems that the first solution is the simple one, and one that
current evidentiary law demands. This result is compelled by both
the confidentiality statutes and the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Thapar v. Zezulka.543 Here, the Texas Supreme Court dealt with
the duty to warn issue and expressly refused to follow Tarasoff v.
Regents of University of California.544 The Texas Supreme Court
declined to adopt a duty to warn, because the Texas confidentiality
statute governing mental health professionals makes it imprudent
to recognize this common law duty.54 5 "The [1]egislature has cho-
sen to closely guard a patient's communications with a mental[-
]health professional. "546
It is generally agreed that the Texas ADR Act contains the
broadest provision of any state's statute to protect communications
made during a mediation. Clearly, as currently practiced in Texas,
542. Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (Cal. 2004).
543. 994 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. 1999).
544. 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976).
545. Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. 1999).
546. Id.
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the participants in a mediation, whether court-ordered or con-
ducted by consent, expect what is said and done in the mediation to
be kept confidential." 7 It is absolutely essential to the continued
success and viability of mediation in Texas that the mediator's
promise of confidentiality be validated by court decision. It would
seem that all mediation communications, with limited excep-
tions,548 should be treated as confidential, privileged, or both.
Because the Texas provisions for confidentiality appear to be
broader than those in other jurisdictions,54 9 out-of-state decisions
547. See Brian D. Shannon, Dancing with the One that "Brung Us"--Why the Texas
ADR Community Has Declined to Embrace the UMA, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 197, 201-02
(2003) ("One of the cornerstones of the enactment was the statute's broad confidentiality
protection.... Hence, taken together these various provisions place limits on future testi-
mony in later adjudications and require confidentiality outside of other legal
proceedings.").
548. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon 2005). An exception to
mediation confidentiality applies if the information is otherwise discoverable. Id. If the
information is otherwise subject to discovery, it is clear that the information is not pro-
tected by the statutes (although section 154.0073 precludes the mediator from being called
to testify even to unprotected information disclosed in a mediation). Id. Thus, if a person
says in the course of an automobile-personal injury mediation, "I ran the stop sign," the
party can be asked at a deposition, "did you run the stop sign." The statutes, however,
without the consent of both parties, preclude the discovery inquiry of, "did you say in the
mediation that you ran the stop sign." There are, of course, other statutory exceptions
requiring the reporting of such things as child or elder abuse, but these are clearly defined
and limited. Id. Additionally, "[sjection 154.073(c) excludes from protection matters
which are independently discoverable or admissible, while section 154.073(d) acknowl-
edges that other unspecified legal requirements may compel disclosure to the court." Irene
Stanley Said, Comment, The Mediator's Dilemma: The Legal Requirements Exception to
Confidentiality Under the Texas ADR Statute, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 579, 586 (1995). Informa-
tion outside of the subject matter of the mediation may be subject to disclosure through
parties other than the mediator. See In re Daley, 29 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2000, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (allowing a participant in the mediation to be
deposed about whether he left the mediation). Finding that this related to something other
than the subject of the mediation, the court allowed the testimony:
Rather than a blanket confidentiality rule for participants, the statute renders confi-
dential a "communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute
made by a participant in an ADR procedure." We do not find the questions-whether
Daley attended the mediation and whether he had the mediator's permission to leave
when he did---concern the subject matter of the underlying suit or the manner in
which the participants negotiated.
Id.
549. See Joshua J. Engelhart, Federal Mediation Privilege: Should Mediation Commu-
nications Be Protected From Subsequent Civil & Criminal Proceedings, 1999 J. Disp.
RESOL. 73, 77-78 (1999) ("The Texas ADR Statute has been considered one of the most
comprehensive in providing the protection of confidentiality of written and oral communi-
cations made during the mediation process.").
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usually associated with the enforcement of mediated settlement
agreements are of questionable value. Many of the federal deci-
sions are encumbered with "the tangled issues of choice of law
550
and the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to create new
privileges.55' Several recent cases from other jurisdictions demon-
strate the conflicting results occurring in other jurisdictions.552
X. CONDUCT OF MEDIATION
A. Coercive Mediation Prohibited
Judge Hittner, in Allen v. Leal, directly condemned coercive
mediators. 3 In Allen, the plaintiffs contended that they had been
compelled by the mediator to settle the case.554 In considering the
question, the Texas Association of Attorney-Mediators (AAM)
filed an amicus brief discussing the issues of the case, but did not
take a position as to the outcome of the case.555 Nevertheless, one
550. See Edward F. Sherman, Confidentiality in ADR Proceedings: Policy Issues Aris-
ing from the Texas Experience, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 541, 556 (1997) (suggesting that the
broad protections afforded by the Texas confidentiality provisions might not be available in
federal courts).
551. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (stating that the Court does
not apply an evidentiary privilege unless it "promotes sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence" (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
47 (1980))).
552. Compare Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1132-33 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (balancing the benefits of justice of receiving the evidence despite a privilege of
the parties and the mediator, and the mediation process, and concluding the benefit was
great and the burden was modest), with Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 745, 746 (10th
Cir. 1992) ("revealing statements or comments made at a settlement conference is a serious
breach of confidentiality"). See generally Christopher DeMayo, The Mediation Privilege
and Its Limits: Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999), 5
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 383 (2000) (arguing for a narrow interpretation of statutes to allow
only compelled testimony regarding legitimacy of mediation process or legal claims uncon-
nected to that addressed in the mediation); Mindy D. Refenacht, The Concern over Confi-
dentiality in Mediation: An In-Depth Look at the Protection Provided by the Uniform
Mediation Act, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 113 (2000) (examining the historical issues arising
related to confidentiality and mediation and addressing the Uniform Mediation Act's pro-
posed remedies); Joshua P. Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Priv-
ilege and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 157 (1994) (advocating for a
broad privilege that would be uniformly applied on both the federal and state levels); Kate
Hollenbeck, The Sounds of Silence: Compelling Mediator Testimony in Olam v. Congress
Mortgage Co., CONFLICT RESOL. Q., Fall 2002, at 5, 5-21 (discussing the benefits of confi-
dentiality in mediation and noting that policy favors nondisclosure).
553. Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947-48 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
554. Id. at 947.
555. Id.
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of the authors of the brief, the president of the Houston Chapter of
the AAM, John Lee Arellano, was publicly quoted as saying,
"[w]hat some people might consider a little bullying is really just
part of how mediation works. ' 556 Judge Hittner, after quoting this
statement, continued:
This egregious statement, directed to the public, made by the presi-
dent of the AAM, outside of the courtroom and in a local newspa-
per, is especially deplorable given that, pursuant to the standards
governing the conduct of mediators in Texas, '[a] person appointed
to facilitate an alternate dispute resolution procedure under this sub-
chapter shall encourage and assist the parties in reaching a settle-
ment of their dispute but may not compel or coerce the parties to
enter into a settlement agreement.'. . . Coercion or 'bullying' clearly
is not acceptable conduct for a mediator in order to secure a settle-
ment, notwithstanding the statement of the president of the
AAM.557
There is a good deal of merit in Judge Hittner's conclusion, given
the definition of mediation in the Texas ADR Act, which states:
"Mediation is a forum in which an impartial person, the mediator,
facilitates communication between parties to promote reconcilia-
tion, settlement, or understanding among them" and "[a] mediator
may not impose his own judgment on the issues for that of the
parties. ' 5 8 The standards of mediation adopted by the Alternate
Dispute Resolution Section of the State Bar of Texas and by the
Texas Supreme Court also support Judge Hittner's conclusion:
Professional Advice. A mediator should not give legal or other pro-
fessional advice to the parties.
Comment (a). In appropriate circumstances, a mediator should en-
courage the parties to seek legal, financial, tax or other professional
advice before, during, or after the mediation process.
Comment (b). A mediator should explain generally to pro se parties
that there may be risks in proceeding without independent counsel
or other professional advisors.55 9
556. Id.
557. Id. at 948 (footnote omitted).
558. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023(a), (b) (Vernon 2005).
559. State Bar of Texas, Alternative Dispute Resolution Section, Ethical Guidelines
for Mediators, http://www.texasadr.org/ethicalguidelines.cfm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005) (on
file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
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Many mediators, particularly those doing personal injury media-
tions, feel compelled to evaluate the case for the parties under
strict time constraints. Bluntly, this is not mediation. Rather, it is a
mediated settlement conference (i.e., a one-person moderated set-
tlement conference).56 ° There is nothing wrong or illegal about
this, but it is not mediation. Section 154.025 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code describes the moderated settlement
conference in terms that describe the forceful evaluative proceed-
ings that go under the name of mediation:
(a) A moderated settlement conference is a forum for case evalua-
tion and realistic settlement negotiations.
(b) Each party and counsel for the party present the position of the
party before a panel of impartial third parties.
(c) The panel may issue an advisory opinion regarding the liability or
damages of the parties or both.
(d) The advisory opinion is not binding on the parties.
561
B. The Mediator May Not Later Be Appointed As an Arbitrator
or Guardian Ad Litem
The Ethical Guidelines for Mediators developed by the Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution Section of the State Bar of Texas and the
Supreme Court of Texas 562 state that "[a] person serving as a medi-
ator generally should not subsequently serve as a judge, master,
guardian ad litem, or in any other judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
in matters that are the subject of the mediation. ' 563 That provision
was enforced in In re Cartwright.564 There, the court of appeals
held invalid a trial court's order appointing an arbitrator other than
560. See generally John G. Mebane, III, Comment, An End to Settlement on the Court-
house Steps? Mediated Settlement Conferences in North Carolina Superior Courts, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 1857 (1993) (discussing the benefits and pitfalls to mediation).
561. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.025(a)-(d) (Vernon 2005).
562. Tex. Sup. Ct., Approval of Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, Misc. Docket No.
05-9107 (June 13, 2005), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/05/
05910700.pdf (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); see also Supreme Court Approves
Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, 68 TEX. B.J. 856, 857-58 (2005) (announcing and discuss-
ing the guidelines).
563. Supreme Court Approves Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, 68 TEX. B.J. 856, 858
(2005).
564. See In re Cartwright, 104 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
orig. proceeding) (recognizing problems with regard to confidentiality in allowing the me-
diator to serve as arbitrator).
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the one named in the parties' agreement to arbitrate, who had ac-
ted as a mediator in the same parties' dispute regarding possession
of their child.565
The mediation process encourages candid disclosures, including dis-
closures of confidential information, to a mediator. It is the potential
for the use of that confidential information that creates the problem
when the mediator, over the objection of one of the parties, becomes
the arbitrator of the same or a related dispute. Just as it would be
improper for a mediator to disclose any confidential information to
another arbitrator of the parties' dispute, it is also improper for the
mediator to act as the arbitrator in the same or a related dispute
without the express consent of the parties.566
In Isaacson v. Isaacson,567 a New Jersey court used similar rea-
soning to disqualify a guardian ad litem who attempted to act as
mediator. 68 By doing so, the individual was disqualified as both an
ad litem and as a mediator.569 It seems clear that the same result
would occur under the Texas ADR Act.
XI. COST OF MEDIATION
A. Mediation Costs Taxable in State Court570
Chapter 154 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code re-
quires the court to "tax the fee for services of an impartial third
party as other costs of [the] suit." '571 In Texas Parks & Wildlife De-
partment v. Davis, the trial court, in its judgment, appropriately
565. Id. at 708-14; accord Bowden v. Weickert, No. S-02-017, 2003 WL 21419175, at
*3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 20, 2003) (finding the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his powers
by first acting as the mediator in a contract dispute).
566. In re Cartwright, 104 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist. ] 2003, orig.
proceeding) (footnote omitted).
567. 792 A.2d 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
568. See Isaacson v. Isaacson, 792 A.2d 525, 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(finding that the roles of guardian ad litem and mediator are so inherently incompatible as
to make it imprudent for one person to serve as both).
569. See id. at 535-36 (noting that though the mediator was effective, one cannot serve
as both mediator and guardian ad litem because of the corresponding conflicting
obligations).
570. See Brad A. Allen & John E. Ellis, Jr., What Are Taxable Court Costs in Texas?,
Hous. LAw., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 14, 15 (listing "alternative dispute resolution fees charged
by an appointed mediator or arbitrator" as acceptable taxable court costs).
571. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.054(b) (Vernon 2005).
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"awarded Davis all original costs associated with the suit. '57 2 The
court noted that "because the $250.00 mediation fee is an original
cost under section 154.054(b), and because the trial court properly
awarded Davis the costs expended for the suit, there was no error
in taxing the mediation fee against the Department.
573
Note that it has been held that a party does not have standing to
complain that mediation costs were taxed against the party's attor-
ney, even though section 7.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code provides that "[a]n attorney who is not a party to a
civil proceeding is not liable for payment of costs incurred by a
party to the proceeding, ' 574 and the attorney failed to perfect an
appeal to the court of appeals, and thus could not complain of the
assessment of costs against him.575
B. Mediation Costs May Not Be Taxable As Costs in Federal
Court
In Scribner v. Waffle House, Inc.,576 the plaintiffs moved for at-
torneys' fees and reimbursement for other specified expenses, in-
cluding costs of filing, depositions, and other fees.577 Additionally,
the plaintiffs requested payment for travel expenses, subpoena
costs, and many other expenses-most of which were not compen-
sable. 8 The court concluded that mediation costs, among others,
were not compensable in federal court.5 79 This premise was re-
cently followed in McCoy v. Hernandez.8 ° In McCoy, the defend-
ants filed an extensive bill of costs. 581 The court listed several
statutorily recoverable costs and the plaintiff objected that many of
572. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370, 376 (Tex. App.-Austin
1999, no pet.).
573. Id.
574. Palmer v. Diversified Fin. Sys. Inc., No. 14-97-00529-CV, 1998 WL 322694, at *1
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 18, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
575. Id.
576. No. CA 3-91-CV-2667-R, 1998 WL 47640 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 1998).
577. Scribner v. Waffle House, Inc., No. CA 3-91-CV-2667-R, 1998 WL 47640, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 1998).
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. See No. 3:96-CV-2694-R, 1999 WL 38161 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 1999) (discussing
which mediation costs are awarded and which are not).
581. McCoy v. Hernandez, No. 3:96-CV-2694-R, 1999 WL 38161, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
15, 1999).
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the filed costs were noncompensable, including mediation fees. 582
The court agreed with the plaintiff's objection concerning media-
tion fees and ruled that, following Scribner, these fees were not
compensable.583
X1I. THE EFFECT OF MEDIATION UPON LIMITATIONS
An interesting question was raised, although not directly de-
cided, in A & A Insulation-Contractors v. Professional Services In-
dustries, Inc.5 84 The question is: Does an agreement to mediate, or
participate in a mediation process, or both toll the applicable stat-
ute of limitations? 585 The court in A & A Insulation-Contractors
does not decide the question because the plaintiff had declined to
accept the settlement.
586
XIII. DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE DURING MEDIATION
The disclosure of the identity and report of an expert witness
during the course of a mediation does not relieve the party from
formally complying with the requirements for supplementing inter-
rogatories and disclosing the identity of an expert as soon as practi-
cal, at least where the trial court chooses to exclude the testimony
of the expert.587
XIV. MEDIATOR LIABILITY
There are few reported Texas cases where actions have been
filed against mediators, and none where a mediator has been held
liable for any act or omission connected with the conduct of a me-
diation. It is unlikely that there will be many such cases, because
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. No. 03-96-00642-CV, 1997 WL 250514, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin May 15, 1997,
writ denied) (not designated for publication).
585. Id. at *3.
586. Id. at *3-4; see also Woodlands Christian Acad. v. Logan, No. 09-97-348-CV, 1998
WL 257002, at *4 (Tex. App-Beaumont May 21, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publi-
cation) (affirming the trial court's denial of arbitration/mediation).
587. See Cruz v. Furniture Technicians of Houston, Inc., 949 S.W.2d 34, 35-36 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (rejecting the excuse that the failure to formally
designate the expert witness as soon as practicable was based on the belief, albeit mistaken,
that the case would settle).
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any plaintiff will have to show that an act or omission of the media-
tor caused some legal injury. 8
In Lehrer v. Zwernemann,589 the plaintiff sought to hold his two
attorneys and the mediator liable for malpractice. 590  Among the
grounds alleged by the plaintiff was one based upon the failure of
the mediator to disclose prior relationships with the opposing at-
torney. The trial court sustained a "no evidence" motion for sum-
mary judgment for the mediator.5 91 The appellate court affirmed,
finding that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence that he had
suffered legal injury as a result of the mediator's actions at the me-
diation.592 The court of appeals, pointing out that the mediator had
facilitated a settlement that resulted in the plaintiff signing a volun-
tary settlement agreement, found the plaintiff's assertion, that he
would not have used the mediator if he had known of the prior
relationship, to be insufficient. 593  "However, appellant did not
state that he would not have entered into the settlement agree-
ment[,]" and thus neglected to show that the failure of the media-
tor was a legal cause of the injury.594 Two alternative grounds for
the holding were advanced: (1) there was evidence that the plain-
tiff's attorney knew of the prior relationship; and (2) there was no
evidence offered of any specific injuries or damages caused by the
mediator.595
588. See, e.g., Hay v. Shell Oil Co., 986 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1999, pet. denied) (stating that as a rule, when a wrongful act causes legal injury, a cause of
action accrues); see also Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147, 148 (2003)
("In the absence of formal quality control mechanisms, private lawsuits offer a theoretical
vehicle for controlling mediators' practices."). "In reality, however, it is extraordinarily
difficult to sue a mediator successfully for her mediation conduct. As an empirical matter,
few former clients have sued mediators for injuries stemming from mediation-specific con-
duct, and none of those suits has resulted in an enforced legal judgment for the former
client." Id. (footnote omitted).
589. 14 S.W.3d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston f1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
590. Lehrer v. Zwernemann, 14 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2000, pet. denied).
591. Id.
592. Id. at 778.
593. Id. at 777-78.
594. Id. at 777.
595. Zwernemann, 14 S.W.3d at 778.
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XV. CONCLUSION
In reality there can be no conclusion to an article purporting to
collect the opinions on a subject. The moment the article is pub-
lished, it will become outdated by the next judicial decision re-
ported on the topic. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to attempt
to summarize the current state of the law in Texas concerning me-
diation. With almost two decades of experience, the law of media-
tion is fairly clear. The Texas courts, with the exception of the
opinions on confidentiality and the early mis-steps on enforcement
of settlement agreements, have done a good job in interpreting and
applying the Texas ADR Act insofar as it applies to mediation.
It remains to be seen whether Texas will continue to lead in the
field of mediation or be dethroned from that position. The future
turns on the confidentiality decisions and the continued acceptance
by the Texas Legislature that additional statutory "fiddling" is not
required.
